Zedner v. United States

547 U.S. 489 (2006)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

In March 1996, D attempted to open accounts at seven financial institutions using counterfeit $10 million United States bonds. One bond was issued by the 'Ministry of Finance of U.S.A.' Others contained misspelled words such as 'Thunted States' and the 'Onited States' (United States), 'Dhtladelphla' (Philadelphia), 'Cgicago' (Chicago), and 'forevev' (forever). D presented the bonds and almost immediately arrested by the Secret Service. Following arraignment on a criminal complaint, he was released on bond. On April 4, 1996, a grand jury indicted D on seven counts of attempting to defraud a financial institution. On June 26, the District Court, citing the complexity of the case, granted what is termed an 'ends-of-justice' continuance, see § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), until September 6. On September 6, the District Court granted another continuance, this time until November 8. At the November 8 status conference, D requested, without opposition a further adjournment to January 1997. The District Court instructed D as follows: 'I think if I'm going to give you that long an adjournment, I will have to take a waiver for all time.' D responded that it would 'waive for all time. That will not be a problem. That will not be an issue in this case.' The District Court reasoned: 'If you can waive [the Act] by inaction, i. e., not raising the motion to dismiss, you can waive affirmatively, knowledgeably, intelligently your right to do so, your right to a speedy trial, and your right to make a motion to dismiss for the speedy trial.' The District Court produced a preprinted form--apparently of its own devising--captioned 'Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights.' The court led D and his counsel through the form, and both signed it. Among other things, the form stated: 'I wish to waive my rights to a speedy trial . . . under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.), under the Rules of this Circuit and under the Speedy Trial Plan adopted by this Court.' The form stated: 'I have been advised and fully understand that . . . I also waive any and all rights to make a motion to dismiss the indictment . . . against me for the failure of the Court to give me a speedy trial and that I waive all of such rights to a speedy trial and to make such a motion or motions for all time.' After signing the form, D requested that a further status conference be scheduled for January 31, 1997, and the court agreed. At the January 31 conference, D sought another continuance. The District Court made no mention of the Act and did not make any findings to support the exclusion of the 91 days between January 31 and D’s next court appearance on May 2, 1997. The dog and pony show went on for the next four years. D's counsel sought to be relieved because D insisted that he argue that the bonds were genuine. The court ultimately granted the counsel's request to withdraw. D was examined by a psychiatrist, who determined that D was competent to stand trial. D then asked to proceed pro se and sought to serve subpoenas on, among others, the President, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the late Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek, and ''The Treasury Department of Treasury International Corporation.'' Eventually, the court dismissed a jury panel, finding that D was incompetent, and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment. The Court of Appeals vacated that order and remanded it for further hearings. In July and August 2000, the District Court held hearings and received a further briefing on the competency issue. On March 7, 2001, while the competency issue remained under submission, D moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with the Act. The court refused because of the “for all time” waiver. On April 7, 2003, the trial began. D was found guilty on six counts of attempting to defraud a financial institution, The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that D would not be heard to complain about the delays which he caused. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.