Young v. State

753 So.2d 725 (2000)

Facts

D was charged with aggravated child abuse of her seven-year-old son. The information alleged that D 'did maliciously punish the said child, by striking said child with a cord, in violation of Section 827.03(2)(b). Section 827.03(2)(b) provides that ''aggravated child abuse' occurs when a person . . . maliciously punishes . . . a child.' D had called the sheriff's office to complain that a relative was teaching her two boys how to steal. Since the boys had not yet stolen anything, the deputy who responded to the call explained that there was nothing he could do. The same deputy responded to another call. Upon arriving, he observed several bruises and abrasions on the back, neck, arms, and chest of D's seven-year-old son. The child told the deputy that D had questioned him about some missing money, and had then hit him with a telephone cord. D told the deputy that she had 'blacked out,' and did not remember what had happened. A nurse counted 17 separate 'marks' on the child, which appeared to have been inflicted within the previous two days. D told the investigator that the child had become upset because she had told him that he could not go on an outing, and had thrown the joy stick of a computer game at her. D said that she responded by hitting the child with the computer cord. D also told the investigator that her two sons were 'out of control'; that the child had stolen money from her purse; that she had called the authorities seeking help in disciplining the boys; and that, after the incident, she had tried to drop the boys off at the Juvenile Justice Center but, finding it closed, had taken them to their father's home instead. The child testified that D had punished him for something he had not done by spanking him with a folded extension cord. The child denied any recollection of having spoken to either the deputy or the investigator from the Department of Children and Families about the incident. D moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence failed to establish that the punishment inflicted had been maliciously motivated, as required by section 827.03(2)(b). D requested that the following instruction be given, instead of the standard instruction: 'Malice' means ill will, hatred, spite, an evil intent. D claimed the standard jury instruction included a definition of malice that was at odds with the definition found in prior decisions of the supreme court. The trial court refused to give the definition of malice proposed by D, saying that it would give the definition contained in the standard instruction because it believed that it was obliged to do so. The trial court instructed: For purposes of the alleged offense, the word maliciously means wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse. D was found guilty. D was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 67 months in prison. D appealed.