Williams v. Taylor, Warden

529 U.S. 362 (2000)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Stone's death was determined to be from blood alcohol poisoning, and the case was considered closed. Six months after Stone's death, Williams (D) while incarcerated in city jail for an unrelated offense, confessed that he had killed Stone after Stone refused to lend him' 'a couple of dollars.'' D said he had killed Stone with a mattock and taken the money from his wallet. Williams (D) was convicted of robbery and capital murder and sentenced to death. D had committed a series of crimes after the murder, and the state introduced that into the sentencing phase of D’s trial. D has also set fire to the jail while awaiting trial. The state’s experts testified that there was a high probability that he posed a continuing threat to society. One of D’s victims from a subsequent robbery was comatose. D offered evidence from his mother and two neighbors that he was a good boy and a snippet from an interview with his psychiatrist that he took the bullets out of his gun in one of his robberies so he would not injure anyone. Counsel asked the jury to give weight to the fact that D had turned himself in on four crimes and that the police would not have otherwise solved them. The weight of counsel’s closing consisted of how difficult it would be to spare D’s life. D was sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed and D sought state collateral relief. The state judge found that his trial attorneys had been ineffective during sentencing. Among the evidence reviewed that had not been presented at trial were documents prepared in connection with D's commitment when he was 11 years old that dramatically described mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during his early childhood, as well as testimony that he was 'borderline mentally retarded,' had suffered repeated head injuries, and might have mental impairments organic in origin. It was also revealed that the same experts who had testified on the State's behalf at trial believed that D if kept in a 'structured environment,' would not pose a future danger to society. The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed and held that the trial judge had misapplied the law in equating prejudice with pure outcome determination and that there was no reasonable possibility that the omitted evidence would have affected the jury’s sentencing. D sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. That judge identified five categories of mitigating evidence that had been failed to be introduced, rejected the argument that counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation had been a strategic decision to rely on the fact that D had confessed, and that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the result would have been different. The District Court also found that the Virginia Supreme Court was erroneous in its interpretation that Lockhart had modified Strickland for determining prejudice. The District Court found the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Federal law under 2254(d)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.