Williams v. City Of Yonkers

60 A.2d 1017 (2018)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

P's employment position with D with required him to possess a valid New York State class B commercial driver license to operate a D-owned sanitation truck. P obtained that license in 1987. By letter dated June 1, 2009, D informed P that he no longer possessed a valid New York State class B commercial driver license and advised him that, unless he obtained such a license by August 28, 2009, his employment would be terminated. P's employment as terminated on August 28, 2009, due to his failure to produce proof that he had a valid class B commercial driver license. On April 4, 2013, P, acting pro se, commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding against the City, alleging that he was wrongfully terminated from his position and that his union failed to grieve his termination or obtain a hearing prior to his termination. P claimed he was unable to renew his class B commercial driver license due to a learning disability and that D had helped him obtain his prior license. P alleged that other people who worked for D did not have the required commercial driver license and were not terminated. P sought reinstatement to his former position and back-pay. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding on the grounds that the petition was time-barred, the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the papers were facially defective. In August 2015, P commenced this action to recover damages and reinstatement to his prior position as a result of his wrongful termination. D moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (7) to dismiss the complaint, and the Supreme Court granted the motion. The court determined that the first two causes of action were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as those causes of action were the same as those alleged in the previous CPLR article 78 proceeding, which had been dismissed. The court determined that the third and fourth causes of action were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. P appealed.