Wilkie v. Robbins

Facts

P owns and operates the High Island Ranch, a commercial guest resort stretching across some 40 miles of territory. The ranch is a patchwork of mostly contiguous land parcels intermingled with tracts belonging to other private owners, the State of Wyoming, and the National Government. D tried to induce the ranch's previous owner, George Nelson, to grant an easement for public use over South Fork Owl Creek Road, which runs through the ranch and serves as a main route to the upper Rock Creek area. For a while, Nelson refused from the fear that the public would disrupt his guests' activities. Shortly after agreeing to sell the property to P, in March 1994, Nelson signed a nonexclusive deed of easement giving the United States the right to use and maintain the road along a stretch of his property. In return, D agreed to rent Nelson a right-of-way to maintain a different section of the road as it runs across the federal property and connects otherwise isolated parts of the holdings. Nelson conveyed the ranch to Robbins, who continued to graze cattle and run guest cattle drives in reliance on grazing permits and a Special Recreation Use Permit (SRUP) issued by D. P knew nothing about the easement across South Fork Owl Creek Road. D failed to record it, and upon recording his warranty deed P took title to the ranch free of the easement, by operation of Wyoming law. When D discovered its screw-up, Vessels, an employee of D, telephoned P and demanded an easement to replace Nelson's. P refused but would consider granting one in return for something. Vessels allegedly told P that ''the Federal Government does not negotiate,'' and talks broke down. Over the next several years Ds, who are current and former employees of D, carried on a campaign of harassment and intimidation aimed at forcing P to regrant the lost easement. Many of Ds’ actions were petty and immature but some of them charged P with crimes. P decided not to complain administratively. D brought administrative charges against P for trespass and other land-use violations. P contested a number of these charges, but not all of them, administratively. When D refused to repair a section of road across federal land, P fixed the public road himself, even though D had refused permission. D fined P for trespass but offered to settle the charge and entertain an application to renew the old maintenance right-of-way. P appealed to the IBLA, which found that P had admitted the unauthorized repairs when he sent the Bureau a bill for reimbursement. The Board upheld the fine and rejected P's claim that D was trying to ''blackmail'' him into providing the easement. P did not seek judicial review of the IBLA's decision. D charged P with two counts of knowingly and forcibly impeding and interfering with a federal employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), a crime with a penalty of up to one year in prison. The jury acquitted P after deliberating for less than 30 minutes. The jurors 'were appalled at the actions of the government' and one  said that 'Robbins could not have been railroaded any worse . . . if he worked for the Union Pacific.' P moved for attorney's fees and the trial judge denied the motion, and P appealed too late. D denied renewal of P’s SRUP.  P did not seek judicial review. D revoked P's grazing permit. P appealed to the IBLA, which stayed the revocation pending resolution of the appeal. Vessels and defendants Darrell Barnes and Miller tried to catch P trespassing by driving cattle over a corner of land administered by the Bureau. From a nearby hilltop, they videotaped ranch guests during the drive, even while the guests sought privacy to relieve themselves. P alleges, Barnes and Miller broke into his guest lodge, left trash inside, and departed without closing the lodge gates. Defendant David Wallace spoke with Preston Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Indian Affairs who manages lands along the High Island Ranch's southern border, and pressured him to impound P's cattle. Smith told P but did nothing more. P and D settled disputes but the settlement came apart when D began formal trespass proceedings against P and unilaterally voided the settlement agreement. Robbins tried to enforce the agreement in federal court, but a District Court denied relief in a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals in February 2006. P sued Ds asking for compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.  P also made a RICO claim charging defendants with repeatedly trying to extort an easement from him, as well as a similarly grounded Bivens claim that Ds violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Ds filed a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity and failure to state a claim, which the District Court granted. The Court of Appeals reversed. On remand, Ds moved to dismiss on qualified immunity. As to the RICO claim, the District Court denied the motion; as to Bivens, it dismissed what P called the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution and those under the Fifth Amendment for due process violations, but it declined to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim of retaliation for the exercise of P's right to exclude the Government from his property and to refuse any grant of a property interest without compensation. Ds again moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held: 'If an official obtains property that he has lawful authority to obtain, but does so in a wrongful manner, his conduct constitutes extortion under the Hobbs Act.' It also held that P's allegations involving individual action unrelated to final agency action are permitted under Bivens. Ds appealed. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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