Wiggins v. Smith, Warden

123 S.Ct. 2527 (2003)

Facts

Police discovered 77-year-old Florence Lacs drowned in the bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland. D was indicted for the crime. Two Baltimore County public defenders, Carl Schlaich and Michelle Nethercott, assumed responsibility for D's case. D elected to be tried before a judge in Baltimore County Circuit Court. On August 4, after a 4-day trial, the court found D guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft. D elected to be sentenced by a jury. Counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of sentencing in hopes of presenting D's case in two phases. Counsel intended first to prove that Wiggins did not act as a 'principal in the first degree,' that he did not kill the victim by his own hand. Counsel then intended, if necessary, to present a mitigation case. Counsel argued that bifurcation would enable them to present each case in its best light; separating the two cases would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting their claim that D was not directly responsible for the murder. The court denied the bifurcation motion, and sentencing proceedings commenced immediately thereafter. Nethercott told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than D actually killed Lacs. Counsel then explained that the judge would instruct them to weigh Wiggins' clean record as a factor against a death sentence. She concluded: 'You're going to hear that D has had a difficult life. It has not been easy for him. But he's worked. He's tried to be a productive citizen, and he's reached the age of 27 with no convictions for prior crimes of violence and no convictions, period... . I think that's an important thing for you to consider.' During the proceedings themselves, counsel introduced no evidence of D's life history. Before closing arguments, Schlaich made a proffer to the court, outside the presence of the jury, to preserve bifurcation as an issue for appeal. He detailed the mitigation case counsel would have presented had the court granted their bifurcation motion. He explained that they would have introduced psychological reports and expert testimony demonstrating D's limited intellectual capacities and childlike emotional state on the one hand, and the absence of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for empathy, and his desire to function in the world on the other. At no point did Schlaich proffer any evidence of D's life history or family background. The jury returned with a sentence of death. A divided Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. D sought post-conviction relief in Baltimore County Circuit Court. With new counsel, he challenged the adequacy of his representation at sentencing, arguing that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. Hans Selvog, a licensed social worker, certified as an expert by the court testified concerning an elaborate social history report he had prepared containing evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster parents. Relying on state social services, medical, and school records, as well as interviews with petitioner and numerous family members, Selvog chronicled petitioner's bleak life history. In April 1994, at the close of the proceedings, the judge observed from the bench that he could not remember a capital case in which counsel had not compiled a social history of the defendant, explaining, 'not to do a social history, at least to see what you have got, to me is absolute error. I just--I would be flabbergasted if the Court of Appeals said anything else.' However, the trial court denied D's petition for post-conviction relief. The court concluded that 'when the decision not to investigate ... is a matter of trial tactics, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel.' The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that trial counsel had made 'a deliberate, tactical decision to concentrate their effort at convincing the jury' that appellant was not directly responsible for the murder. D filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The trial court granted him relief, holding that the Maryland courts' rejection of his ineffective assistance claim 'involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.' The court rejected the State's defense of counsel's 'tactical' decision to ' 'retry guilt,' ' concluding that for a strategic decision to be reasonable, it must be 'based upon information the attorney has made after conducting a reasonable investigation.' The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that counsel had made a reasonable strategic decision to focus on petitioner's direct responsibility.