Westinghouse (P)) shipped several large electric rotors aboard the SS LESLIE LYKES owned by D. Two P rotors were being shipped in separate containers in No. 4 hold. In addition to this cargo, bags of flour were stowed in open spaces in the No. 4 hold. Among the cargo stowed in the No. 3 LTD were bales of cotton. Cotton is flammable and, if ignited, is very difficult to extinguish. The LESLIE sailed and on August 29th, it encountered rough weather as it was sailing on the edge of a hurricane. Though the weather was rough, it was not unusual or unexpectable. A clanking noise was heard by the crew, which they believed at the time had come from the No. 4 hold. No attempt was made by the crew to investigate the clanking sound at that time, even though there was access to No. 4. At the time the noise was heard, the vessel was still sailing in rough seas. Roughly twelve and one-half hours after the clanking was heard, smoke was observed from the bridge coming from the kingpost forward of the No. 3 hold. The smoke detector indicated that a fire was in the No. 3 LTD. An access way was provided in the No. 3 hold, but access could not be obtained because bags of flour had been stowed over the manhole cover in the No. 3 upper tween deck. A thermometer was placed in the No. 4 hold at the hottest spot on the bulkhead. The bulkhead temperatures indicated that the fire was in the vicinity of the starboard aft section of No. 3 LTD, where the cotton and drill pipes had been stowed. The vessel was equipped with a CO2 injection system in each hold. The weatherdeck hatch of the No. 3 hold was sealed with tape to prevent as much as possible the leakage of CO2. Also, the blowers of the vessel's ventilator system were shut off and taped to avoid providing the fire with any ventilation. Twenty-four bottles of CO2 were released into No. 3 LTD, in accordance with the directions provided by the manufacturer of the CO2 system. The crew continued to introduce CO2 into No. 3 LTD until the vessel arrived at El Ferrol, Spain, at which time the thermometer that had been placed on the bulkhead indicated the temperature had dropped to 110 degrees. The smoke abated, as indicated by the smoke detector. Neither the smoke detector nor the kingpost ventilator revealed any indication of smoke from September 1st until the opening of the No. 3 weatherdeck hatch at El Ferrol on September 8. With 2 canisters of CO2 left, steam was introduced into No. 3 LTD, in addition to the insertion of CO2 into the compartment. This was accomplished by drilling five 1/2-to 3/4-inch holes in the bulkhead of No. 4 hold just above the location of the stow of drilling pipes located in No. 3 LTD. Steam lances were inserted into the holes. Captain Metcalf discussed the events in full with D's managing personnel by radiotelephone each day. Mr. Lucian Castro, then a supervisory port engineer for D in New Orleans, was sent to meet the vessel at El Ferrol. Also, numerous Spanish firefighting authorities and port officials, including representatives of the Spanish Navy and the Navy's firefighting school, were present at the meeting. An access hole was cut in the same location on the bulkhead where the steam lance holes had been drilled. Castro and John Ebanks, the boatswain, attempted entry through the access hole in order to assess the status of the fire. Ebanks sprayed water over the cargo in the compartment to see if smoke would rise, in order to establish the existence or nonexistence of a fire. No signs of smoke were visible to either party. Castro ordered the ventilator system's fan turned on momentarily. The CO[2] was forced out of the compartment into the No. 4 hold. Members of the crew standing by in the No. 4 hold were overcome by the gas as a result of not wearing masks. Castro, whose mask became dislodged when he turned to leave the area, passed out and was taken to the hospital. Ebanks was also overcome due to the fact that the hose to his mask did not reach as far as he had ventured at the time the compartment was pressurized. Foam was introduced into the No. 3 LTD compartment via the access hole. This was done by the Spanish Navy Fire Control Unit about 3 1/2 hours after the entry of the boatswain into the compartment. On the following morning, when the hatch covers were removed smoke was seen emanating from the compartment below through the cracks between the sections of the hatch cover. Before the hatch cover could be completely opened a 'whoosh' was heard and flame erupted from the hold, followed by a dull explosion. Firefighters immediately began flooding No. 3 hold with hoses from the top and from the bottom through the use of bilge pumps. Both No. 3 and No. 4 holds were filled with salt water, inundating D's rotors. The firefighting efforts extinguished the fire, saved the lives of the crew, the ship, and most of the cargo, including some of D's cargo. P brought an action against D and D asserted the defense of the Fire Statute. The District Court explained that, under the reasoning of Sunkist Growers, the Carrier may not be exonerated under the Fire Statute unless he first bears the burden of proving that he used due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship or that any unseaworthy condition did not cause the fire and resulting damage. The court concluded that Ds failed to exercise due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel in its stowing bags of flour over the manhole access way to No. 3 lower tween deck. The manhole was not fit for its intended use, and as a result, rendered the LESLIE LYKES unseaworthy. This unseaworthy condition was a proximate cause of the fire and resulting damage to the cargo. . . . Thus, under the holding Sunkist Growers Lykes would be barred from asserting the fire defense. D appealed contending that (1) there was no proof that the fire (or fire damage) was caused by the 'design or neglect' of the owner, and (2) the trial court erroneously relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sunkist. Cargo filed a purported 'protective cross-appeal' to preserve for appeal if we reversed the District Court on the Fire Statute, its objection to the District Court's finding that the firefighting decisions -- and practices -- were not attributable to the owner.