Welch v. United States

136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016)

Facts

Federal law prohibits any felon - meaning a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year in prison - from possessing a firearm. 18 U. S. C. §922(g). A person who violates that restriction can be sentenced to prison for up to 10 years. §924(a)(2). The Armed Career Criminal Act imposes a much more severe penalty. Under the Act, a person who possesses a firearm after three or more convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony” is subject to a minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum sentence of life in prison. §924(e)(1). The ordinary maximum sentence for a felon in possession of a firearm is 10 years. The Court decided Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591 (2015). The court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) was void for vagueness. D was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act before Johnson was decided. D pleaded guilty in 2010 to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Probation Office prepared a presentence report finding that D had three prior violent felony convictions, including a Florida conviction for a February 1996 “strong-arm robbery.” D punched the victim in the mouth and grabbed a gold bracelet from his wrist while another attacker grabbed a gold chain from his neck. D objected to the presentence report, arguing that this conviction was not a violent felony conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The District Court overruled the objection. The Court of Appeals affirmed. D’s conviction became final. In December 2013, D appeared pro se before the District Court and filed a collateral challenge to his conviction and sentence through a motion under 28 U. S. C. §2255. D claimed his strong-arm robbery conviction itself was “vague” and that his counsel was ineffective in allowing him to be sentenced as an armed career criminal. The District Court denied the motion and denied a certificate of appealability. The Court of Appeals entered a brief single-judge order denying the motion for a certificate of appealability. Three weeks later, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson. D filed a motion asking the Court of Appeals for additional time to seek reconsideration of its decision in light of Johnson, but the court returned that motion unfiled because D’s time to seek reconsideration already had expired. D filed a pro se petition for certiorari. The United States (P) also agreed with D that Johnson announced a new substantive rule.