Weiand v. State

732 So.2d 1044 (1999)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

D was charged with first-degree murder for the 1994 shooting death of her husband. D shot her husband during a violent argument in the apartment where the two were living together with their seven-week-old daughter. D claimed self-defense and presented battered spouse syndrome experts in support of her claim. D testified that her husband had beaten and choked her throughout the course of their three-year relationship and had threatened further violence if she left him. Dr. Lenore Walker testified that D suffered from 'battered woman's syndrome.' Dr. Walker concluded that when Weiand shot her husband she believed that he was going to seriously hurt or kill her. Dr. Walker opined that there were several reasons why Weiand did not leave the apartment that night during the argument, despite apparent opportunities to do so: she felt that she was unable to leave because she had just given birth seven weeks earlier; she had been choked unconscious; she was paralyzed with terror; and experience had taught her that threats of leaving only made her husband more violent. D requested that the following standard jury instruction be given: If the defendant was attacked in [his] [her] own home or on [his] [her] own premises, [he] [she] had no duty to retreat and had the lawful right to stand [his] [her] ground and meet force with force, even to the extent of using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent either death or great bodily harm. The trial court refused the request and gave the standard jury instruction from Bobbitt: The fact that the defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify her use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if by retreating she could have avoided the need to use that force. The prosecutor stressed as 'critical' that the killing could not be considered justifiable homicide unless Weiand had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, including fleeing her home. D was found guilty of second-degree murder. The Second District affirmed her conviction and sentence, On rehearing, it certified the question of whether this Court should recede from the Bobbitt precedent.