Walker v. Cronin

Facts

WALKER V. CRONIN 

107 Mass. 555 (1871)

NATURE OF THE CASE: Walker (P), a footwear manufacturer, sought review of a judgment that sustained the demurrer of Cronin (D), alleged tortfeasor, in P’s tort action that arose from interference with employment contracts.

FACTS: P was engaged in the manufacture and sale of boots and shoes. It was necessary for P to employ, and they did employ, a large number of persons as makers of boots and shoes so manufactured by them, all which D well knowing did unlawfully and without justifiable persuade and induce a large number of persons, who were in the employment of P to leave and abandon employment. When P lost the services of said persons P lost business and incurred large expenses to procure other suitable workmen to take the places of those so induced to leave and abandon their employment. P claims it was compelled to pay much larger prices for said work and labor of bottoming boots and shoes than it would otherwise have done. P sued D and D demurred to the complaint. D claimed that the acts alleged do not constitute a legal cause of action in favor of P. P claimed it is not actionable for D to persuade and induce, as alleged, the persons alleged to leave and abandon P's employment. The court sustained the demurrer and P appealed. 

ISSUE: May one who entices away an employee, or induces him to leave his employment, be held liable in damages therefor, provided there exists a valid contract for continued service, known to the defendant? Is interference with a contract without just cause malicious?

RULE OF LAW: One who entices away an employee, or induces him to leave his employment, may be held liable in damages therefor, provided there exists a valid contract for continued service, known to the defendant. Interference with a contract without just cause is malicious.

HOLDING AND DECISION: (Wells, J.) May one who entices away an employee, or induces him to leave his employment, be held liable in damages therefor, provided there exists a valid contract for continued service, known to the defendant? Yes. Is interference with a contract without just cause malicious? Yes. P alleges that D did, 'unlawfully and without justifiable cause, molest, obstruct and hinder the plaintiffs from carrying on' their business of manufacture and sale of boots and shoes, 'with the unlawful purpose of preventing the plaintiffs from carrying on their said business, and wilfully persuaded and induced a large number of persons who were in the employment of the plaintiffs,' and others 'who were about to enter into' their employment, 'to leave and abandon the employment of the plaintiffs, without their consent and against their will;' whereby P lost the services of said persons, and the profits and advantages they would otherwise have made and received therefrom, and were put to large expenses to procure other suitable workmen, and suffered losses in their said business. This sets forth (1) intentional and wilful acts (2) calculated to cause damage to P in their lawful business, (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of D, (which constitutes malice,) and (4) actual damage and loss resulting. The intentional causing of such loss to another, without justifiable cause, and with the malicious purpose to inflict it, is of itself wrong. Everyone has an equal right to employ workmen in his business or service; and if by the exercise of this right in such manner as he may see fit, persons are induced to leave their employment elsewhere, no wrong is done to him whose employment they leave, unless a contract exists by which such other person has a legal right to the further continuance of their services. If a contract exists, one who knowingly and intentionally procures it to be violated may be held liable for the wrong, although he did it for the purpose of promoting his own business. No one has a right to be protected against competition; but he has a right to be free from malicious and wanton interference, disturbance, or annoyance. If disturbance or loss comes as a result of competition, or the exercise of like rights by others, it is damnum absque injuria, unless some superior right by contract or otherwise is interfered with. P must make certain, by proof, that there has been in fact a loss that entitles P to reparation; but that difficulty is not encountered in the present stage of this case, where all the facts alleged are admitted by the demurrer. The demurrer also admits the absence of any justifiable cause whatsoever. This decision is made upon the case thus presented, and does not apply to a case of interference by way of friendly advice, honestly given; nor is it in denial of the right of free expression of opinion. We have no occasion now to consider what would constitute justifiable cause. One who entices away a servant, or induces him to leave his master, may be held liable in damages therefor, provided there exists a valid contract for continued service, known to the defendant. This doctrine applies to all contracts of employment, if not to contracts of every description. We are of opinion that a legal cause of action is sufficiently stated in each of the three counts of the declaration.

LEGAL ANALYSIS: On a side note, the court never defined malice. We are sure malice was used in terms of ill will between parties. It was used in a popular sense (malice means hatred, ill will, or hostility to another) and not in law where it means the state of mind manifested by an intent to commit an unlawful act against another. Some make the leap and state that malice is the intentional inducing of the breach without just cause.

To prove the tort of intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; the interferer's knowledge of the relationship or expectancy; intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. … In addition, the interference must be improper as to motive or means before liability will attach. Wallace v. Casa Grande Union High Sch. Dist. No. 82 Bd. of Governors, 184 Ariz. 419, 427, 909 P.2d 486, 494 (App. 1995) (citations omitted).  To be actionable, the interference must 'be both intentional and improper … . If the interferer is to be held liable for committing a wrong, his liability must be based on more than the act of interference alone. Thus, there is ordinarily no liability absent a showing that the defendant's actions were improper as to motive or means.' Safeway Ins. Co. v. Guerrero, 210 Ariz. 5, 11 P20, 106 P.3d 1020, 1026 (2005) (citation omitted); see Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 388, 710 P.2d 1025, 1043 (1985) (superseded by statute not relevant to the issue). 

The Arizona Supreme Court has adopted the factors expressed in Section 767 of The Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) for determining whether conduct is improper for purposes of a tortious interference claim. Whether a particular action is improper is determined by a consideration of seven factors: (a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the actor's motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and (g) the relations between the parties. Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 387, 710 P.2d at 1042. 

Thus, although 'the 'intentional' element of tortious interference focuses on the mental state of the actor, …  the 'improper' element in contrast 'generally is determined by weighing the social importance of the interest the defendant seeks to advance against the interest invaded.'' Safeway, 210 Ariz. at 11 P21, 106 P.3d at 1026 (quoting Snow v. W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Ariz. 27, 35, 730 P.2d 204, 212 (1986)).

Generally, the issue of motive or the propriety of an action is one of fact and not law, but courts may resolve the issue as a matter of law when there is no reasonable inference to the contrary in the record. Woerth v. City of Flagstaff, 167 Ariz. 412, 419, 808 P.2d 297, 304 (App. 1990). The standard for liability, however, 'must be applied with discrimination, particularly where the conduct in question takes place in the context of competitive business activities.' Bar J Bar Cattle Co. v. Pace, 158 Ariz. 481, 483, 763 P.2d 545, 547 (App. 1988). 

damnum absque injuria : Latin. A loss or damage without legal injury. Damage without wrong. The phrase applies where an accident occurs and no fault or negligence is chargeable to either of the parties to the occurrence, as where the accident was inevitable or is properly characterized as an act of God.

''A tort, whether intentional or negligent, involves a violation of a legal duty imposed by statute, contract or otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person injured. Without such a duty, any injury is 'damnum absque injuria' -- injury without wrong. [Citations.]'' (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 292 [253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948], quoting 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 6, p. 61, italics in original.) 

Damage inflicted without legal wrong. Damage so inflicted gives rise neither to prosecution ad vindictam publicam, nor to action at the instance of the person injured for compensation. Such is damage arising from an accident, or from an act lawful in itself, and not performed with any intent or desire to injure. This is distinguished from the damnum injuria datum (damage inflicted wrongly), which gives rise in many cases both to civil and criminal prosecution and always to the former. Injuria includes any act that is illegal or unwarrantable, and therefore damage is said to be inflicted wrongly, where it arises from fault or neglect. Damage may thus be inflicted by an animal not kept with due care by its proprietor, and for such damage the proprietor is liable.

There are cases when the act of one man may cause damage or loss to another, and for which the latter has no remedy; he is then said to have received damnum absque injuria; as, for example, if a man should set up a school in the neighborhood of another school, and, by that means, deprive the former of its patronage; or if a man should build a mill along side of another, and consequently reduce his custom. Another instance may be given of the case where a man using proper care and diligence, while excavating for a foundation, injures the adjoining house, owing to the unsuitable materials used in such house; here the injury is damnum absque injuria. When a man slanders another by publishing the truth, the person slandered is said to have sustained loss without injury. A legal right must be violated in order that an action of tort may be maintained. Damage is not enough there must also be 'injuria.'

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