Velez v. Awning Windows, Inc.

375 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P worked for a company owned by Ismael Nieves-Valle (Nieves) in 1987. P and Nieves became romantically entangled. P claims that after she broke off their adulterous affair, she was sexually harassed. She further claims that, in March 2000, this harassment culminated in her dismissal. P sued employment discrimination. On April 30, 2002, P moved for the entry of default, because D failed to answer or otherwise plead within the allotted twenty-day period. On May 3, 2002, the district court ordered the defendants to show cause, on or before May 15, why a default should not be entered. On May 22, 2002, the plaintiff renewed her motion for entry of default, noting that neither defendant had responded to the show-cause order. On May 31, 2002, the district court defaulted both defendants. On June 6, 2002, citing Nieves's sudden death in a helicopter accident on May 25, D asked the district court to set aside the default and afford Ds forty-five additional days within which to answer the complaint. On June 24, 2002, the district court granted P's request to substitute the Estate in Nieves's stead as a party defendant. The court granted D's request to set aside the default and ordered Ds to answer or otherwise plead by July 19. The court warned that failure to comply 'on or before the aforementioned date SHALL result in the Court re-entering default and proceeding with a Damages Hearing.' On July 11, 2002, Ds answered P's complaint. Discovery then ensued. On November 15, 2002, P moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. On December 2, 2002, Ds' opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment was due, but none was filed. On December 5, 2002, the district court granted Ds until December 13 to submit their opposition. On December 13, 2002, instead of filing their opposition by the extended deadline, Ds moved for a further extension. On December 17, 2002, the district court held an omnibus scheduling conference. On December 20, 2002, the court entered an order that, inter alia, directed Ds to file (i) no later than January 7, 2003, answers to P's interrogatories; (ii) no later than January 17, 2003, a legal memorandum, concerning the 'admissibility of hearsay and other evidence' following a party's death prior to discovery; and (iii) no later than January 17, 2003, a memorandum detailing AWI's finances and the Estate's assets. The court admonished that Ds' failure to comply with any of these directives would 'result in sanctions including . . . elimination of all defenses set forth in their answer to the complaint.' In tandem with these orders, the court further extended the time for filing an opposition to P's motion for partial summary judgment. The court fixed February 20 as the due date for the opposition, warned the defendants that 'no extensions will be given,' and advised them that, should they 'fail to file an opposition on or before the aforementioned date the Court SHALL consider Plaintiff's motion as unopposed.' On January 7, 2003, Ds served their answers to interrogatories. On January 15, 2003, Ds filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action against Nieves (and, therefore, could not sue the Estate) because supervisors are not personally liable under Title VII. On January 17, 2003, Ds moved for an extension of time, up to and including February 4, 2003, within which to file the hearsay memorandum and comply with the remaining commands of the OSC. Although the court took no immediate action on this motion, the defendants failed to make the required filings. On February 5, 2003, citing P's delay in completing her deposition and answers to interrogatories, Ds moved to extend the deadline for filing an opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment from February 20 to February 28. On February 20, 2003, Ds asked for another extension, this time to March 3, for the filing of their opposition. On March 18, 2003, Ds made multiple submissions: (i) they finally filed their opposition to P's motion for partial summary judgment; (ii) in the same memorandum, doubling in brass as a motion to dismiss, they claimed for the first time that the plaintiff had failed to file a timely administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) and that, as a consequence, her action should be jettisoned for want of subject-matter jurisdiction; and (iii) in a separate memorandum, they addressed the district court's hearsay concerns. On March 20, 2003, faithful to its earlier warning that no extensions of time would be countenanced, the district court disregarded Ds' out-of-time filings, denied their sundry extension requests, and deemed P's motion for partial summary judgment unopposed. As a sanction for Ds' failure to comply with the court's earlier order to submit both a legal memorandum anent hearsay evidence (which had been filed over two months late) and a memorandum detailing the defendants' financial resources (which had not been filed at all), the court denied Ds' motion to dismiss the supervisory liability claim. On March 23, 2003, the district court refused to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. On March 25, 2003, the district court handed down an opinion in which it granted Ps motion for partial summary judgment. That decision resolved the issue of liability. On July 22-24, 2003, the district court convened a damages hearing before a jury and, pursuant to the jury's verdict, entered final judgment for P in the sum of $740,000. On August 15, 2003, Ds filed a timely notice of appeal.