Vela v. Marywood

Facts

D, nineteen years of age and unmarried, learned she was pregnant. She was still living with her parents, and had completed two years at Austin Community College where she had earned high grades and was planning to attend Southwest Texas State University. Her parents have been married for more than twenty-five years and have lived in the same house for over twenty years. She sought counseling services from P, a licensed child-placing agency. She met with a P counselor several times in early March. D informed P that she wanted to place her child for adoption. D discussed an 'open adoption,' a process by which the birth mother expresses her criteria for adoptive parents. P showed D an 'Affidavit of Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights' (the 'relinquishment affidavit'). P did not discuss the relinquishment affidavit and did not explain the meaning of the term 'irrevocable'; rather, P simply 'showed her the form' but did not give her a copy to take with her to study. D selected an adoptive couple at her next counseling session and had a face-to-face meeting with them on April 8. The prospective adoptive parents indicated their willingness to comply with post-adoption visits. P discussed their sharing plan with D. P admitted it can do nothing if the adoptive parents decide, post-adoption, to disregard the sharing plan. The executive director of P admits that the sharing plan is an 'empty promise.' D gave birth to a son on April 24. D signed a temporary foster-care request. P told D that she 'would always be able to visit her baby' and that her baby would always know that D was his mother. D cried throughout the one-and-one-half-hour visit. P scheduled a subsequent meeting with D to complete the adoption process. The child was placed in foster care on April 27. D signed a relinquishment affidavit. During the meeting, with D's parent present, P told D that she would 'always be that child's birth mother and that with her sharing plan that she had with the adoptive family that she would have an opportunity to be in that child's life forever'; that she would 'always have a relationship with [the adoptive] family and with [her] child'; that requests she made of the adoptive family would be 'respected'; that the baby would have 'two mothers,' 'both of whom would have input into his life'; that D 'would be able to see her son grow up'; and that the birth family would be like the child's extended family. D specifically asked what the agency could do to guarantee that she would have continual, post-adoptive visits with the child. P responded by 'assuring her that . . . the adoptive family has an adoption worker working with them and that they would encourage them to respect what she wished for in terms . . . of sharing and visits. And during their . . . face-to-face visit and even after that, they said that they would respect her wishes in . . . having that sharing plan.' D testified that the promises were 'the only reason she signed.' Before the signing meeting, D did not have a copy of the relinquishment affidavit and did not review it with her parents. P never told D that signing the relinquishment affidavit meant that she would 'never have any legal rights to see [her] child.' D was not aware, and no one informed her that she could have signed a second foster-care agreement to allow herself more time to make the final decision. P never told D that she could seek legal counsel or another person's opinion. P never revealed that the relinquishment affidavit could nullify the sharing plan that she believed would allow her a continuing role in her child's life. The following day, April 29, Corina asked to visit her child. P filed a petition to terminate D's parental rights. D was allowed to visit the child for one hour. D then called P and told P that she wanted her child back. P responded that there was nothing that could be done. D's mother called as well. P told the mother that the relinquishment was 'irrevocable and that it is signed and that there is no way to undo the document.' On May 12, an associate judge recommended termination of D's parental rights. D gave notice that she was appealing the associate judge's termination recommendation to the district court. The district court conducted a de novo trial. The guardian ad litem appointed for the child recommended that termination would not be in the best interest of the child and testified that D would be a competent parent and the child would be well cared for. After hearing this testimony, the district court terminated D's parental rights and appointed P managing conservator. This appeal resulted.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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