Vaden v. State

Facts

John Snell, an undercover agent for the Alaska Department of Fish & Game, posed as a hunter and contracted for guiding services from Vaden (D). Snell was instructed on how to conduct himself on the hunt. During the hunt, Snell shot and killed four foxes from D's aircraft even though fox season was closed. D provided Snell with the shotgun used to kill the foxes and maneuvered the aircraft so Snell could shoot the foxes. D was convicted and appealed. 

Undercover agent Pagel accompanied a licensed guide Saltz (D1) into the bush. The pair flew out to Talarik Creek, and Pagel testified that D1 told him the area was limited to fly-fishing and gave him a fly rod. D1 then gave Pagel a baited spinning rod because the fishing was slow. The pair caught 30 trout, and when they stopped biting, they caught 20-30 pike, killed them, and threw them into the lake. D1 then transported Pagel to a caribou hunt area with little air traffic and Pagel was handed a rifle from D1 and shot and killed a bull. D1 also shot a cow and another bull leaving the meat and talking antlers as a trophy. D1 was convicted. 

D appealed his convictions, contending that no illegal acts were committed by Snell, and thus no criminal liability could attach to Vaden for 'aiding and abetting' or transportation of illegally taken game, and alternatively, if crimes had been committed by Snell, such law enforcement tactics amounted to entrapment as a matter of law and violated due process. The court of appeals upheld D's convictions. The court of appeals concluded that 'convicting D as an accessory, when the principal was an agent for the government, is a cause for concern.' However, 'any government overreaching is adequately covered by the defense of entrapment,' which relieves a defendant of liability where police conduct has induced a defendant to commit an offense by such persuasion or inducement as would be effective to persuade an average person to commit the offense. In a prosecution for an offense in which legal accountability is based on the conduct of another person, it is not a defense that the other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of an offense based upon the conduct in question or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, that the offense, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class of persons to which the defendant does not belong, and the defendant is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity; or the other person is not guilty of the offense. Unconscionable police conduct not involving inducement might, by itself, justify the dismissal of a charge, but only where the police conduct 'shocked the universal sense of justice and violated the concept of fundamental fairness.' Chief Judge Bryner dissented, observing that 'the state's effort to ferret out crime consisted of Snell's shooting foxes as a means of convicting D vicariously for the shooting of those very same foxes.' Such conduct, Judge Bryner asserted, '[falls] below an acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of justice' and thus justified dismissal of the charges against D. D's petition for hearing was granted.

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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