D denied tenure to Rosalie Tung, an associate professor on the Wharton faculty. Tung filed a sworn charge of discrimination with P. The charge alleged that Tung was the victim of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin, in violation of § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Tung alleged that the department chairman had sexually harassed her and that, in her belief, after she insisted that their relationship remain professional, he had submitted a negative letter to the University's Personnel Committee which possessed ultimate responsibility for tenure decisions. She alleged that her qualifications were 'equal to or better than' those of five named male faculty members who had received more favorable treatment. Tung noted that the majority of the members of her department had recommended her for tenure, and stated that she had been given no reason for the decision against her, but had discovered of her own efforts that the Personnel Committee had attempted to justify its decision 'on the ground that the Wharton School is not interested in China-related research.' P requested a variety of relevant information from D. D refused to provide some of that information. P issued a subpoena seeking, among other things, Tung's tenure-review file and the tenure files of the five male faculty members identified in the charge. D refused to produce a number of the tenure-file documents. D urged P to 'adopt a balancing approach reflecting the constitutional and societal interest inherent in the peer review process' and to resort to 'all feasible methods to minimize the intrusive effects of its investigations.' P concluded that the withheld documents were needed in order to determine the merit of Tung's charges. P rejected D's proposed balancing test, explaining that 'such an approach in the instant case . . . would impair P's ability to fully investigate this charge of discrimination.' D continued to withhold the tenure-review materials. P applied for enforcement of its subpoena. The court entered an enforcement order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the enforcement decision. The court rejected D's claim that policy considerations and First Amendment principles of academic freedom required the recognition of a qualified privilege or the adoption of a balancing approach that would require the Commission to demonstrate some particularized need, beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. D urges the court to recognize a qualified common-law privilege against disclosure of confidential peer review materials. D asserts a First Amendment right of 'academic freedom' against wholesale disclosure of the contested documents.