Oil escaped from an oil retention pit and eventually found its way into a tributary of the Arkansas River system. P notified the regional office of the EPA that a discharge of oil had taken place. P submitted a complete written report of the discharge, which was in turn forwarded to the Coast Guard, the agency responsible for assessing civil penalties under §311 (b)(6). After notice and opportunity for hearing, the Coast Guard assessed a civil penalty against P in the amount of $500. D filed an administrative appeal from this ruling, contending, that the reporting requirements of §311 (b)(5) of the Act violated his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The administrative appeal was denied. P filed suit seeking to enjoin Ps from enforcing §§311 (b)(5) and (6) and from collecting the penalty of $500. P filed a separate suit in the same court to collect the unpaid penalty. The District Court eventually ordered the two suits consolidated for trial. The Court rejected Ps contention that the reporting requirements of §311 (b)(5), violated his right against compulsory self-incrimination. A jury found that P's facility did, in fact, spill oil. The Court reduced the penalty to $250 because of the amount of oil that had spilled and because of its belief that P had been diligent in his attempts to clean up the discharge after it had been discovered. The Court of Appeals reversed. Although Congress had labeled the penalty as civil and that the use of funds collected under that section were to finance the administration of the Act indicated a 'remedial' purpose for the provision, under the standards set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963), §311 (b)(6) was sufficiently punitive to intrude upon the Fifth Amendment's protections against compulsory self-incrimination. D appealed.