Nature of the Case
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Facts
D along with two partners purchased a vacant commercial building and the property on which it was located for $175,000. An insurance policy for the property, set to expire November 17, 2006, covered up to $4,250,000 in fire-related losses. The property without the building 'was worth as much or more than it was worth with the building on it.' The building burned down the evening of November 12, 2006. Investigators soon determined that the fire was the result of arson. The police arrested twenty-year-old Truman, Jr., who confessed that he had burned the building at his father's direction. D and his business partners filed an insurance claim for the building in February 2007. D was arrested by state law enforcement officials in March 2007, and both he and Truman, Jr. were indicted by a grand jury. Jr. pleaded guilty to third-degree arson pursuant to a cooperation agreement with the district attorney and served a two-year term of imprisonment. D was tried in state court on arson, fraud, and related charges, with Jr. as the main witness against him. The charges were dismissed because the State prosecutors proved unable to corroborate Jr.'s testimony, as required under New York law when an accomplice testifies for the prosecution. Jr. entered into a cooperation agreement with the United States Attorney's Office. At the federal trial, P called Jr. as a witness. Jr. testified that he burned down the building. Jr. stated that he had discussed the building with his father the day before the arson, but Jr. declined to disclose what his father had told him. P asked Jr. why he set the fire and about the content of his conversations with his father, but Jr. refused to answer. Over d's objection, P read portions of Jr.'s testimony from D's state court trial, in which Jr. confirmed that his father had asked him to start the fire. D was found guilty. The District Court conditionally granted D's motion for a new trial under Rules 29(d) and 33(a) on four grounds: (1) Jr.'s 'patently incredible' testimony constituted an 'exceptional circumstance' warranting a new trial; (2) it had erroneously admitted Jr.'s prior state court testimony because it was hearsay, irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial and misleading; (3) P had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during its cross-examination of D and in its summations; and (4) these errors were not harmless because Jr.'s state court testimony was the only direct evidence of D's guilt. P appealed.
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