United States v. Riffe

28 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1994)

Facts

D is an inmate, and a federal grand jury indicted D and Stephanie Kania, D's girlfriend, for conspiracy to distribute marijuana and aiding and abetting the use of the mail to facilitate distribution of marijuana. Kania pled guilty and agreed to cooperate with the government. D was tried by a jury and convicted of all three counts. Kania got packages of marijuana or money to buy it from packages sent to a post office box. D would call Kania and instruct her to retrieve the package from her post office box and deliver the marijuana to a prison guard at a location outside the prison. The guard would then deliver the marijuana to D inside the prison. Kania knew the packages contained either marijuana or money to purchase marijuana which would eventually be smuggled into the prison and that D was the only person who knew her post office box number. D's theory of defense throughout trial was that he was under duress, including the threat of immediate harm, from a prison gang to supply marijuana to members of the gang as repayment of a debt which he owed to them because D's girlfriend, Kania, had used or failed to deliver $1,300 worth of cocaine that belonged to the gang. D offered significant evidence that gang members threatened to kill him if he did not carry out this smuggling operation, and he argues that he was entitled to have the jury pass on his defense of duress rather than have it ruled out by the court. D presented evidence that protective segregation was ineffective and that he would have been put in additional danger from other inmates because prison officials would have required him to identify the inmates who were threatening him. An inmate testified that he saw and heard gang members threatening D with knives over the smuggling of marijuana in order to repay the $1,300 debt and that D was reasonably afraid for his life. That inmate testified that D could not have obtained adequate protection by prison officials. Postal Inspector Durand also testified that D had relayed to him that he feared for his life while in the prison, and Kania testified that she was concerned with D's physical safety in the prison and that D had told her that he was being threatened if he did not continue to produce marijuana for inmates in the prison. The district court refused to give the instruction because it found that the defendant had failed to meet the duress instruction requirements set forth in Singleton. That court adopted five factors that control whether a jury instruction presenting a duress defense should be given. Evidence must be presented: (1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm; (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm. (5) that defendant did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than absolutely necessary. The district court interpreted the third factor as a per se rule. The district court compared the case to prison escape cases which generally require the escapee to turn himself in to police as soon as reasonably possible after escape in order to be entitled to consideration of the defense of duress. United States v. Bailey. It found D's failure to seek protection prohibited him from receiving the duress instruction under the 'reasonable, legal alternative' prong of Singleton. D was convicted and appealed.