United States v. Manske

186 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D was indicted for cocaine trafficking. The government got Stephen Pszeniczka and Daniel Knutowski to plead guilty to charges including distribution of cocaine, and, with their cooperation, successfully prosecuted others. They fingered D as their drug source. D vigorously denied this. At D's trial, both men testified that between 1993 and 1996, D was their primary supplier of cocaine. They alleged that D sold them 5.78 kilograms of cocaine during the three years he was their supplier. Mary Colburn testified that on three occasions she either saw D deliver cocaine to Pszeniczka and Knutowski, or was nearby when such drug transactions occurred. Another witness, Jackie Campbell, had no direct knowledge of D's involvement in drug deals but was able to provide inculpatory details against D that were consistent with Knutowski and Pszeniczka's story. The government had no physical evidence to corroborate the witness testimony against D. There were no surveillance recordings implicating D, no cocaine found on his person or property, no money the government could trace to illegal drug transactions and no admissions by D. The government presented telephone records showing calls between D and Knutowski, but because their lines were not wire-tapped the substance of the conversations was not identifiable. D testified and claimed that he was involved in some illegal bookmaking with the witnesses. D had no physical or documentary evidence with which to exonerate himself. D had to destroy the credibility of the witnesses against him. D was able to impeach some of them with the deals they made with the government and with their extensive history of drug use and drug dealing. D also sought to cross-examine Pszeniczka about past acts of witness intimidation which the government acknowledged had taken place, arguing that these acts were probative of Pszeniczka's truthfulness. The government made a pre-trial motion in limine to block the defendant from introducing any evidence relating to threats Pszeniczka made to various witnesses who testified in a related case. The trial court kept out a half a dozen incidents where Pszeniczka, or people acting on his behalf, allegedly threatened potential witnesses in an effort to keep them from incriminating him. The government contends that under Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) this evidence related to specific instances of conduct not probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and that the threat evidence only went to show Pszeniczka's propensity for violence, and therefore could not be admitted. The trial judge observed that FRE 608(b) did not allow D to use the threat evidence to cross-examine Pszeniczka because the threats '[did] not impact upon his credibility.' The court also stated that 'the fact that there was a threat offered by Pszeniczka does not go to his character for truthfulness,' but rather, to the 'character [for] violence and [Pszeniczka's] threatening nature.' D was convicted and appealed.