United States v. Haymond

139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

A jury found Haymond (D) guilty of possessing child pornography in violation of federal law. The law authorized the district judge to impose a prison term of between zero and 10 years, and a period of supervised release of between 5 years and life, §3583(k). D had no criminal history and was working to help support his mother who had suffered a stroke. D was sentenced to a prison term of 38 months, followed by 10 years of supervised release. D encountered trouble on supervised release. D denied possessing or viewing child pornography, and each time the polygraph test indicated no deception. When P conducted an unannounced search of his computers and cellphone, it turned up 59 images that appeared to be child pornography. P sought to revoke D’s supervised release and secure a new and additional prison sentence. A hearing followed with a district judge acting without a jury, and under a preponderance of the evidence rather than a reasonable doubt standard. The judge found it more likely than not that D knowingly downloaded and possessed 13 images. With that, the question turned once more to sentencing. Under 18 U. S. C. §3583(e)(3), a district judge who finds that a defendant has violated the conditions of his supervised release normally may (but is not required to) impose a new prison term up to the maximum period of supervised release authorized by statute for the defendant’s original crime of conviction, subject to certain limits. The judge could sentence D to between zero and two additional years in prison. Under §3583(k), added to the Act in 2003 and amended in 2006 if a judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant on supervised release committed one of several enumerated offenses, including the possession of child pornography, the judge must impose an additional prison term of at least five years and up to life without regard to the length of the prison term authorized for the defendant’s initial crime of conviction. The judge imposed five years. The court of appeals held that a jury had convicted D beyond a reasonable doubt of a crime carrying a prison term of zero to 10 years. The new prison term included a new and higher mandatory minimum resting only on facts found by a judge by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held the statute violated D’s right to trial by jury. P appealed.