Booker (D) was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base (crack). Having heard evidence that he had 92.5 grams in his duffel bag, the jury found him guilty of violating 21 U. S. C. §841(a)(1). That statute prescribes a minimum sentence of 10 years in prison and a maximum sentence of life for that offense. The Sentencing Guidelines required the District Court Judge to select a 'base' sentence of not less than 210 nor more than 262 months in prison. The judge held a post-trial sentencing proceeding and concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that D had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and that he was guilty of obstructing justice. Those findings mandated that the judge select a sentence between 360 months and life imprisonment; the judge imposed a sentence at the low end of the range. Instead of the sentence of 21 years and 10 months that the judge could have imposed on the basis of the facts proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, D got a 30-year sentence. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this application of the Sentencing Guidelines conflicted with Apprendi. The majority relied on Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), that 'the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.' The court held that the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. P appealed.
Fanfan (D) was charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U. S. C. §§846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Under the Guidelines, without additional findings of fact, the maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict was imprisonment for 78 months. The trial judge conducted a sentencing hearing at which he found additional facts that, under the Guidelines, would have authorized a sentence in the 188-to-235-month range. Under the Guidelines, these additional findings would have required an enhanced sentence of 15 or 16 years instead of the 5 or 6 years authorized by the jury verdict alone. The judge concluded that he could not follow the particular provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines 'which involve drug quantity and role enhancement.' The judge followed the provisions of the Guidelines that did not implicate the Sixth Amendment by imposing a sentence on respondent 'based solely upon the guilty verdict in this case.' P filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and a petition in this Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment.