United Hauler’s Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority

550 U.S. 330 (2007)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

New York’s Legislature and Governor created the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority (D), a public benefit corporation. D is empowered to collect, process, and dispose of solid waste generated in the Counties. To further the D’s governmental and public purposes, Counties may impose “appropriate and reasonable limitations on competition” by, for instance, adopting “local laws requiring that all solid waste … be delivered to a specified solid waste management-resource recovery facility.” Private haulers would remain free to pick up citizens’ trash from the curb, but D would take over the job of processing the trash, sorting it, and sending it off for disposal. D collected “tipping fees” to cover its operating and maintenance costs for these facilities. These fees significantly exceeded those charged for waste removal on the open market, but they allowed D to do more than the average private waste disposer. The fees enabled D to provide recycling of 33 kinds of materials, as well as composting, household hazardous waste disposal, and a number of other services. The Counties enacted “flow control” ordinances requiring that all solid waste generated within the Counties be delivered to D’s processing sites. Ps sued alleging that the flow control laws violate the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce. Without the flow control laws and the associated $86-per-ton tipping fees, they could dispose of solid waste at out-of-state facilities for between $37 and $55 per ton, including transportation. The District Court read Carbone as categorically rejecting nearly all flow control laws. The Second Circuit reversed, reasoning that Carbone and our other dormant Commerce Clause precedents allow for a distinction between laws that benefit public as opposed to private facilities. The court remanded to decide whether the Counties’ ordinances nevertheless placed an incidental burden on interstate commerce, and if so, whether the ordinances’ benefits outweighed that burden. A Magistrate Judge and the District Court found that the haulers did not show that the ordinances imposed any cognizable burden on interstate commerce. The Second Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit had recently issued a conflicting decision holding that a flow control ordinance favoring a public entity does facially discriminate against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.