D awarded P a catering contract. P expanded its operation extensively, spending roughly one million dollars in the process. The term of the Agreement was for a period of 3 years(s), but either party was allowed to terminate upon ninety (90) days' prior written notice. D's contracting representative assured P that United had never used the ninety-day termination provision in the past and that the provision existed only to provide D with an 'out' in the event D chose not to fly to Anchorage in the future. D used the termination clause after about one year. P sued alleging wrongful termination, fraud, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The judge went on to find: (1) that the facts surrounding the fraud claim were disputed and should go to the jury; (2) that the ninety-day termination clause was an unambiguous no-cause termination provision and that D did not breach the express terms of that clause; and (3) that a genuine factual dispute existed as to P's covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, which was permissible under Illinois law, despite existence of a no-cause termination clause. The jury returned a verdict finding that D had not engaged in fraud but had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarded damages. D appealed.