P commenced the present action to recover damages from her former employer's insurers, American International Group, Inc. (D) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (D) arising from her unlawful discharge in 2003, pursuant to an employment practices liability insurance policy. P seeks to collect from Ds the $4 million judgment in her favor in Tucker v. Journal Register East, Doc. action against her former employer, Journal Register East. P served a subpoena on a non-party Marsh USA, Inc. (M). M produced several hundred documents in response. P contends that relevant emails sent to a former employee of M, Lucy Carter, who handled the Journal Register Company's applications for the EPLI insurance. Specifically, missing was 'an email dated April 19, 2007, from Ricardo Venegas of JRC [Journal Register Company] to Lucy Carter, . . . inquiring whether D had been notified of two lawsuits against JRC, one of which was Tucker's.' Doc. #67, p. 5 (describing 'April 19 Email'). P had previously independently obtained this and other similar emails after subpoenaing Journal Register Company. P immediately requested that M perform a further search of its computer records for additional emails. M ordered its IT Department to restore Ms. Carter's email profile for the relevant period. M produced additional emails and correspondence. P found the production response deficient, noting that 'internal emails regarding her claim . . . suddenly stop without explanation as of April 24, 2007.' P and M talked about the issues, and a search of M's records by Datatrack, an independent contractor, retained and compensated by P. P thought there was a deal to inspect, but M refused. P has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(2)(B) 5 for an order compelling the inspection of electronic records in the possession of M. P seeks to obtain all the M 'emails and correspondence regarding [her] claim.' P requests the Court to compel M to allow Datatrack to inspect M's computer records, and to 'bear the costs of the inspection.' P argues that the Court has 'inherent authority to compel the inspection of records under Rule 37(b). The Court need only find 'good cause' for the production, bearing in mind that discovery is 'relevant' if it is even 'reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.' P also posits that it is also reasonably calculated to uncover the extent to which there has been spoliation of what would have otherwise been admissible evidence. M contests on five grounds: (1) P's original subpoena did not call for the production or inspection of what she now seeks, and a motion to compel is thus premature and unwarranted; (2) the request is unduly burdensome and overly broad; (3) P cannot show anything less than good faith in the electronic searches that M has already performed and no further search is warranted; (4) P is inappropriately utilizing third-party discovery to try to cobble together a new claim to drag M into this case as a defendant; and (5) P's request impermissibly and unnecessarily intrudes on the legitimate confidentiality interests of M and its customers.'