Torres v. Jai Dining Services (Phoenix) Inc.

497 P.3d 481 (2021)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

Villanueva spent hours drinking with friends at Jaguars Club and became intoxicated. He was eventually embroiled in a dispute with a club employee and told to leave. Bouncers pushed him out the door around 2:30 a.m. Villanueva got into his truck and drove away. Villanueva drove to his brother's house, and remained for more than an hour to 'chill out for a little bit and sober up.' Around 4:00 a.m., a friend used Villanueva's truck to drive Villanueva, his girlfriend, and her friend to Villanueva's house and drop off the truck. Once home, Villanueva slept for a short time before his girlfriend woke him, and he agreed to take her friend home. The friend drove Villanueva's truck to her house while Villanueva slept in the backseat. After dropping her off, Villanueva resumed driving. Just after 5:00 a.m., he struck Suarez and Guillen's car, killing them. Villanueva was convicted of two counts of manslaughter. Suarez's and Guillen's families sued Villanueva and D, which owns Jaguars Club. D moved for summary judgment, arguing that Villanueva's decision to drive again after arriving home was an intervening and superseding cause of Suarez's and Guillen's deaths as a matter of law relieving D of liability. D reasserted its intervening and superseding cause argument in a motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the trial court denied. The court instructed the jury on intervening and superseding cause. The jury returned a verdict in Ps' favor on their common law negligence claims and their dram shop liability claim but found in D's favor on Ps' statutory negligence claim. The jury returned a verdict in Ps' favor on their common law negligence claims and their dram shop liability claim but found in D's favor on Ps' statutory negligence claim. See A.R.S. § 4-311(A). The jury awarded $2 million in compensatory damages and apportioned 60% of the fault to Villanueva and 40% to D. The court denied D's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court of appeals reversed holding the trial court erred by not entering judgment in D's favor as a matter of law. It concluded that once Villanueva had 'safely reached his residence, gone to bed, and fallen asleep, with no known compelling reason to leave,' his independent decision to leave and drive his truck was an intervening and superseding cause that broke the chain of proximate causation. Ps appealed.