P married Russell Firestone, and three years later, they separated, and P filed a complaint for separate maintenance. Her husband counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery. After a lengthy trial, the Circuit Court issued a judgment granting the divorce requested by P's husband. The court actually made the following statements on the record: 'According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extramarital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory nature which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testimony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indicate that defendant was guilty of bounding from one-bed partner to another with the erotic zest of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testimony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding of the court that neither party is domesticated, within the meaning of that term as used by the Supreme Court of Florida.' D jumped on the story like a pig in mud. D printed the following: 'DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone Jr., 41, heir to the tire fortune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime Palm Beach schoolteacher; on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach, Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, 'to make Dr. Freud's hair curl.'' P demanded in writing a retraction from D, alleging that a portion of the article was 'false, malicious and defamatory.' D declined to issue the requested retraction. P sued D, and the jury awarded P $100,000. The judgment was affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. D contends that it cannot be liable for publishing any falsehood defaming P unless it is established that the publication was made 'with actual malice,' as that term is defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. D contends that P is a 'public figure.' D also claims that it merely reported a judicial proceeding, a class of subject matter which petitioner claims deserves the protection of the 'actual malice' standard even if the story is proved to be defamatorily false or inaccurate.