Tesser v. Board Of Education

190 F. Supp. 2d 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P was an Assistant Principal in Charge of P.S. 177 in Community School District 21. P applied for the position of principal at P.S. 177. Regulations required community school boards to follow a three-step process in selecting supervisory personnel. Level I involved the establishment of a screening committee consisting of six to ten parents, two teachers, the superintendent, and community school board members. The committee determined the selection criteria and interviewed at least ten candidates. Only the parents and teachers were allowed to vote for at least five of those candidates, who were then recommended to the community superintendent. Level II required the superintendent to evaluate the recommended candidates and recommend two to the community school board. Level III required the community school board either to select one for appointment or to request that the superintendent or committee consider other candidates from the original Level I pool.' P learned that the parents of P.S. 177 were opposed to her appointment because she was Jewish. P informed her supervisor of the anti-Semitic animu. He began to believe P was acting irrationally, that she would be unable to work effectively with the school community, and that her perception of anti-Semitism was unfounded. He testified that P yelled at him, that he thought she was accusing the parents of anti-Semitism rather than admitting that they simply did not like her and that she stated she was 'going to get' the parents on the selection committee. Even with the alleged prejudice P was not eliminated from consideration and she successfully moved on to the second level of consideration. No parent indicated a desire to prevent P's selection because she was Jewish, but they believed that P was being given preferences because she was Jewish, but in any event, the parents wanted another as their candidate. After passing Level I, P hired an attorney because of her concern about religious discrimination affecting the progress of her candidacy. This upset her superior, and he submitted two others, and thus P was not a finalist. The supervisor testified that his decision not to recommend P was not based on her religion or in retaliation for hiring an attorney, but was the result of his concern that she could not handle the responsibilities of a principal at P.S. 177. P filed an administrative complaint. She was also informed that she would be reassigned to her prior school. P alleged great hostility at the reassigned school and when she first returned she alleged the principal asked her to leave or she would be thrown out. P claimed to have suffered tremendous emotional stress. P filed a claim of religious discrimination and retaliation with the New York Human Rights Commission in June 1993 and requested a transfer. On her own initiative she obtained employment in the Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District ('Plainview'). She was granted a one year leave to take this position and a leave of absence for child-care immediately following her one-year leave to work in Plainview. When it was discovered that she had been working elsewhere while on child-care leave, in violation of the leave policy, she was ordered to return to work in District 21 or risk being reported as an unauthorized absentee. When she did not return, she was deemed resigned, a less severe status than unauthorized absentee because it allowed her the option of withdrawing her resignation. In this case, the jury did not believe that P's version was more probable than not, and it returned a verdict in favor of Ds. The jury unanimously found that P did not prove that the BOE, Community School District 21, Donald Weber, or Michael Miller 'discriminated against her based on her religion,' and it found that P had not proven that the BOE, Community School District 21, Donald Weber, or Michael Miller 'retaliated against her because of her complaining of religious discrimination or because she hired an attorney.' P filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, or alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59.