Taylor v. Canterbury

92 P.3d 961 (2004)

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Nature Of The Case

This section contains the nature of the case and procedural background.

Facts

Terrell Taylor was the owner in fee simple of a 666-acre ranch. D is the personal representative for Terrell, now deceased. On March 4, 1991, Terrell executed a warranty deed that conveyed that property from Terrell as sole owner to Terrell and P as joint tenants. The validity of that deed is not in dispute. In 1997, Terrell executed a second deed: this time a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the property back to himself and P as tenants in common. Terrell's manifest intent was to sever the joint tenancy between himself and P, and to create a tenancy in common. The second deed stated: 'It is my intention by this deed to sever the joint tenancy created by [the 1991 deed], and to create a tenancy in common.' The deed was duly recorded on June 16, 1997-the same day it was executed. Terrell died on August 20, 1999. P filed an action to quiet title to the property to herself as surviving joint tenant and asked the trial court to set aside the 1997 conveyance and award her damages arising out of Terrell's attempted conveyance. The trial court found that 'as a matter of law, the right of survivorship interest of a joint tenant is an estate in land which vests on the creation of the joint tenancy.' The court concluded 'that the rights of a joint tenant or joint tenants are vested and fixed at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy' and therefore the 1997 deed failed to effectively sever the joint tenancy between P and Terrell. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a joint tenant cannot effectively sever a joint tenancy by executing a deed that purports to convey title back to the two individuals as tenants in common. It concluded that once a joint tenancy is created, the rights of each joint tenant are 'fixed and vested.' It was agreed that Terrell's unilateral effort to sever the joint tenancy was an improper 'form of dominion' over P's rights to the property. It noted that Terrell's conveyance to himself was contrary to the general rule that a grantor and grantee cannot be the same person for purposes of conveying property. D appealed.

Issues

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Holding & Decision

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Legal Analysis

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