Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois

830 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987)

Facts

Tobin represents the parents of Michael Strandell in a civil rights action against Jackson County, Illinois. The case involves the arrest, strip search, imprisonment, and suicidal death of Michael Strandell. The plaintiffs filed a written report concerning settlement prospects and stated that they were requesting $500,000, but that the defendants refused to discuss the issue. The district court suggested that the parties consent to a summary jury trial with the objective to induce the parties to negotiate a settlement. Tobin stated that his clients would not consent to such a proceeding. After discovery was closed, the defendants filed a motion to compel production of the witnesses' statements. That was denied because they failed to establish 'substantial need' and 'undue hardship,' as required by Rule 26(b)(3). Another pitch was made by the trial judge for a summary trial and ordered the parties to participate. Tobin objected to the district court's order compelling the summary jury trial. The district court denied this motion. Tobin then respectfully declined to proceed with the selection of the jury. Tobin was then held in criminal contempt for refusing to proceed with the summary jury trial. Tobin was asked to reconsider his position but reiterated his view that the court lacked the power to compel a summary jury trial, and maintained that such a proceeding would violate his client's rights. A criminal contempt judgment of $500 was levied, and Tobin filed this appeal. The trial court stated its positions as The court determined that Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a mandatory summary jury trial. The court pointed out that Rule 16(a) authorizes a court in its discretion to require attorneys 'to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action . . . and . . . (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.' Furthermore, Rule 16(c) provides that 'the participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to . . . (7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute . . . and . . . (11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.' The court admitted that 'its discretion in this context is not unbridled.' However, the court held that Rule 16 grants district courts 'the power to order the litigants to engage in a process which will enhance the possibility of fruitful negotiations.'