Stoller v. Doyle

257 Ill. 369, 100 N.E. 959 (1913)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

The Doyles conveyed land to their son, with the following limitations: he did not have the power to convey the land except to the grantors, and he did not have power to mortgage the land. If the son's wife survived him, she and their children were to have a life estate in the land during the wife's lifetime; upon her death, the land was to go to the children (D). If no children survived the son, the land was to revert to the grantors. A few years later, Doyle executed a second deed granting absolute title in the land to the son. The second deed recited that it was made for the purpose of removing the restrictions contained in the first deed. After the second deed was executed, Doyle's son and his wife conveyed the property to Stoller (P). P then entered a contract to convey the land to Bauman. Bauman refused to accept the deed to the land from P on the grounds that P did not have merchantable title. P claimed that he had fee title, and sued Bauman to compel performance under the contract. The complaint was dismissed. Bauman then sued to recover his deposit on the land. The court entered judgment in Bauman's favor, finding that the first deed from Doyle to his son conveyed a contingent interest, that the second deed did not affect that interest, and that P's title was therefore not merchantable. P then filed an action against Doyle's grandchildren to quiet title in himself. P argued that, after the first conveyance, Doyle retained a reversionary interest in the land, and, by the second deed, he conveyed the reversion, so that the life estate in Doyle's son was merged into the fee, and any intervening contingent interests were destroyed. The lower court quieted title in P. D appeals.