Stoll v. State

762 So.2d 870 (2000)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D was found guilty of premeditated murder in the first degree and was sentenced to death for the murder of his wife, Julie Stoll. Christopher Stewart, who lived with the Stolls and worked for D was the primary witness. Stewart was nineteen years old and D was thirty-three years old. Stewart testified in graphic detail about the plans leading up to the murder, as well as about the details of the murder itself. Stewart testified that he was the one who actually killed Julie Stoll, but that he did so at the personal direction of D, who planned the murder and was present when Julie Stoll was killed. D denied directing or assisting Stewart but did admit to 'participating after the fact.' D discussed a prior domestic violence charge brought by his wife, and he testified that he and his wife had an argument concerning that charge only days before the murder. P called Martin, a longtime friend of Julie Stoll. Martin testified that as soon as she heard that Julie Stoll was dead, she went to the D’s house. As she began to explain why she went to D’s house, defense counsel objected and the trial court sustained the objection as to allowing Martin to testify as to hearsay. Thereafter, in rebuttal, P again called Martin, and again, defense counsel objected on the basis of hearsay. The trial court overruled this objection whereupon Martin testified that: Julie made me promise her in August [1994] when she came to my house one Saturday morning and was upset and shaken and crying, and they had been fighting all night the night before, that if anything ever happened to her I would go to the police and tell them that Michael did it or had it done. That he had threatened to kill her more than once and she . . . she knew he would do it. A month before that incident, she noticed that Julie Stoll was bruised and that Julie Stoll had told Martin that 'Michael did it. And that [Julie] was afraid that he was going to kill her.' P contends that these statements fell within one of two recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule and that they were properly admitted as rebuttal evidence. P argues that Martin's testimony is admissible under the excited utterance exception, section 90.803(2), and the state-of-mind exception, section 90.803(3). Alternatively, P argues these statements became admissible as rebuttal evidence to impeach statements that D made. D was found guilty and sentenced to death. D appealed.