Nature of the Case
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Facts
The Commonwealth employed D to assist in dredging the Ted Williams Tunnel. The dredge was named the Super Scoop which is a massive floating platform from which a clamshell bucket is suspended beneath the water. The bucket removes silt from the ocean floor and dumps the sediment onto one of two scows that float alongside the dredge. The Super Scoop has certain characteristics common to seagoing vessels, such as a captain and crew, navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining area. The Super Scoop has only limited means of self-propulsion. It is moved long distances by tugboat. To work in Boston, it was towed from California through the Panama Canal and up the eastern seaboard to Boston Harbor. It navigates short distances by manipulating its anchors and cables. When dredging the Boston Harbor trench, it typically moved in this way once every couple of hours, covering a distance of 30-to-50 feet each time. P was hired as a marine engineer, to maintain the mechanical systems on the Super Scoop. At the time of the accident, the Super Scoop lay idle and P was on board Scow No. 4, feeding wires through an open hatch located about 10 feet above the engine area. The Super Scoop used its bucket to move the scow. The scow collided with the Super Scoop, causing a jolt that plunged Stewart headfirst through the hatch to the deck below. He was seriously injured. P sued D under the Jones Act alleging that he was a seaman injured by D's negligence. He also filed an alternative claim under § 5(b) of the LHWCA. D moved for summary judgment under the Jones Act arguing that P was not a seaman. D argued that the Super Scoop was not a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act. DiGiovanni v. Traylor Brothers, Inc., 959 F.2d 1119 (CA1 1992), had held that 'if a barge . . . or other float's purpose or primary business is not navigation or commerce, then workers assigned thereto for its shore enterprise are to be considered seamen only when it is in actual navigation or transit' at the time of the plaintiff's injury. The court dismissed P’s complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that it too was bound by DiGiovanni. It reasoned that the Super Scoop's primary function was construction and that '[a]ny navigation or transportation that may be required is incidental to this primary function.' The case was remanded and the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of D on P's alternative claim that D was liable for negligence as an owner of a 'vessel' under the LHWCA. The appeals court affirmed and P appealed.
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