Stelluti v. Casapenn Enterprises, LLC

1 A.3d 678 (N.J. 2010)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

P joined D’s club and signed a limited liability waiver in order to join D’s Gym. On January 13, 2004, while participating in a spinning class, the handlebars on P's spin bike dislodged from the bike, causing her to fall and suffer injuries. This was a dispute over whether P should be bound to a pre-injury waiver of liability that she executed in connection with her membership application and agreement. P's injuries included pain in her neck and shoulders, soreness in her thighs and back, a cracked tooth, and bruises on her legs. P claims to experience persistent pain as a result of the incident. Her medical expert has stated that three years after her accident Stelluti suffers from chronic pain associated with myofascial pain syndrome. P sued for damages against D; the manufacturer of the spin bikes; and ABI Property, the premises owner. The complaint alleged the following negligence claims against D and ABI: 1) 'fail[ing] to properly maintain and set up the stationary bike'; 2) 'fail[ing] to properly instruct P as to how to use the bike [or] exercise proper care'; 3) 'causing a dangerous and hazardous condition to exist'; 4) 'allow[ing] a nuisance to exist'; 5) 'fail[ing] to provide proper safeguards or warnings on the bike'; 6) 'fail[ing] to provide proper and safe equipment'; 7) 'maintain[ing] the bike in an unsafe, hazardous and/or defective manner'; and 8) acting in 'a negligent, careless and reckless manner so as to cause an unsafe hazardous and/or defective condition to exist ... [and failing] to provide proper safeguards and/or warnings.' Plaintiff asserted a products liability claim against Star Trac. D filed a motion for summary judgment. The court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of D. The exculpatory agreement was enforceable because D was not subject to a requirement to perform under a specific legal duty imposed by statute or by regulation; 2) that the waiver was not unconscionable and, further, that P had read and understood the agreement provisions when she signed them; and 3) that the exculpatory language would be applied to cover claims sounding in both negligence and gross negligence. P appealed, and the court held 'that the exculpatory agreement only insulated from ordinary negligence respecting the use of the exercise equipment at its facility,' and that the agreement could not insulate defendant from 'extreme conduct such as reckless, willful or wanton, or palpably unreasonable acts or omissions diminishing the safe condition of its equipment.' The court affirmed, and P appealed. P argues that the language of the agreement was unclear and ambiguous, and thus inadequate; that it is an unconscionable contract of adhesion not entitled to be enforced; and that it is contrary to public policy to allow an exculpatory agreement to be applied in the instant context. P maintains that the spinning instructor's failure to check the handlebars before she allowed P to mount the bike and begin the spin class amounted to gross negligence and, therefore, summary judgment should not have issued.