State v. Sexton

904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006)

Facts

Police found Atsuko Ikeda, lying in the street in Winooski. Ikeda had suffered serious injuries and died shortly after transport to the hospital. Sexton (D) walked onto the crime scene and lay down on the street in front of a police cruiser. D reportedly said, 'Just cuff me, I know I did something bad, I just don't know what.' D was charged with Ikeda's murder. D informed the police that, on the day in question, he had killed his cat and then gone outside intending to kill a person. He recalled lunging at a woman passing on a bicycle (later identified as Ikeda) and then beating her repeatedly until she stopped moving. D later told psychiatrists that he had taken a variety of illegal drugs during the six months preceding the incident. D stated that for about two months, in July and August 2000, he took many 'hits' of LSD and that his last reported use of LSD was two to three weeks before the September killing. D explained that on the night of the incident he felt that he needed to kill people and 'gather their souls.' D was arraignment on a charge of second-degree murder. Dr. Robert Linder, a court-appointed psychologist, concluded that D was insane at the time of the offense. D suffered from either a previously undiagnosed mental disease involving a schizophrenic disorder, or a substance-induced psychosis. In December 2000 Dr. Linder indicated that D's mental state had improved over the course of their interviews and that he appeared to be competent to stand trial. D notified the State that he intended to present expert testimony in support of an insanity defense, and the court granted the State's motion for an independent psychiatric evaluation. The State's psychiatrist, Dr. Albert Drukteinis, filed a report concurring in Dr. Linder's opinion that D was psychotic at the time of the offense but concluding that it was caused solely by D's voluntary use of illegal drugs. P filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent D from presenting an insanity defense at trial, arguing that Vermont law does not recognize temporary insanity caused by the voluntary use of drugs. P also moved to preclude a diminished capacity defense, asserting that second-degree murder based on wanton disregard for the likelihood that one's actions would naturally cause death or great bodily harm is a general intent crime to which the defense has no application. The court held that second-degree murder based on wanton disregard of the likelihood that one's conduct would naturally cause death or great bodily harm is a specific intent crime in Vermont. D was entitled to rely on the defense of diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication. The following June, the court issued a second decision, concluding that D was also entitled to argue that he was legally insane at the time of the killing. Although the court ruled that 'an individual whose mental state is altered solely because of the consumption and abuse of illegal drugs' may not assert an insanity defense, it found that one whose consumption of illegal drugs activates a latent mental disease or defect resulting in a psychotic reaction is entitled to a complete defense to the crime charged, unless D knew or had reason to know that the drugs would elicit such a reaction. P filed this interlocutory appeal of both orders.