State v. Ragland

519 A.2d 1361 (1986)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

D was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, unlawful possession of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a weapon without a permit. Another charge against him, possession of a weapon by a convicted felon was severed on D's motion in order to avoid the inevitable prejudice in the trial of the other charges that would be caused by introducing D's prior felony conviction, an essential element in the severed charge. The prior conviction was not admissible to impeach D's credibility since he did not testify. After the jury's guilty verdict, the severed charge was tried before the same jury. That jury had just convicted D of charges that necessarily included a finding that D was in 'possession of a weapon.' The severed charge was possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Included in the trial court's instructions on the severed charge was the following: If you find that D was previously convicted for the crime of robbery and that he was in possession of a sawed-off shotgun, as you have indicated . . . then you must find him guilty as charged by this Court. If, on the other hand, you have any reasonable doubt concerning any essential element of this crime, then you will find him not guilty.' D was convicted and appealed. D claimed that the portion of the instruction deprived him of his right to a fair trial by jury since it amounted to an instruction to the jury not to consider independently the question of possession but rather to abide by its prior determination of that fact. D's claim was that in effect the court was charging collateral estoppel on that issue. The Appellate Division affirmed holding that the jury was free to make a new independent finding on the possession issue. The Court reversed and remanded the matter to the Appellate Division for reconsideration in light of State v. Collier, 90 N.J. 117 (1982), and State v. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489 (1985). On remand the Appellate Division again affirmed, holding that the jury instruction did not amount to a directed verdict on the possession element of the charge. The Court again reversed, finding 'that the unavoidable effect of the charge was to direct a guilty verdict' on the severed count, and remanded the matter for a new trial. P motioned for reconsideration. It was granted.