State v. Presba

131 Wash.App. 47 (2005)

Facts

In 2003, Shyla Dashiell received notice that her automobile insurance rates had significantly increased. To her surprise, she was told that records indicated that she had been stopped by a state trooper on September 1, 2002, thereafter failed to appear for her court hearings, and, as a result, her driver's license had been suspended. There was also an outstanding warrant for her arrest. Dashiell contacted a number of people at the court that issued the warrant and eventually used a public disclosure request to obtain a videotape of the traffic stop. She recognized the person using her maiden name, birth date, former address, and social security number as a former friend and neighbor, D. D was charged with second-degree identity theft, forgery, and third-degree driving with a suspended license. The state trooper who had conducted the traffic stop testified that D had given Dashiell's maiden name, date of birth, and social security number with such assurance that he was inclined to believe her. The social security number was one digit off from what the Department had for the license record, but D explained that the Department had always had an incorrect number. The trooper was also concerned because the physical appearance notations did not seem to match. But after a half-hour of continued discussion he was sufficiently persuaded that D was who she said she was that he cited her for the infraction of driving without her license on her person and released her. D signed the notice of infraction using Dashiell's maiden name. D's actual driving record showed her license was suspended. D's counsel conceded she had engaged in all the conduct alleged by the State but argued that the purpose of the identity theft statute was limited to financial crimes. D maintained was guilty only of criminal impersonation. The court distinguished the two crimes, noting that one could assume a false identity and thus violate the criminal impersonation statute without using the means of identification of a real person that is required to violate the identity theft statute. It also held that the Legislature had not limited the statute to just financial crimes because it was not necessary to use another person's financial information or actually obtain anything of value to violate the statute. D was convicted and appealed.