State v. Pelham

824 A.2d 1082 (N.J. 2003)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On December 29, 1995, sixty-six-year-old William Patrick was driving northbound on Route 1 in South Brunswick when Pelhem (D), with a blood alcohol content (BAC) between .19 and .22, struck Patrick’s vehicle from behind. Patrick had to be removed from his vehicle with the “jaws of life” and transported to the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital. He suffered numerous injuries, including a fracture of the spinal column, resulting in paralysis from the chest down, a “flailed chest,” contusion and puncture of his lung, a head injury, fractured sinuses, and a broken hip. Patrick was placed on a ventilator and underwent various surgical procedures. Among other complications, Patrick suffered from a number of infections, sepsis, and experienced several bouts with pneumonia. On March 13, 1996, Patrick was transferred to the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation (Kessler). While there, Patrick was unable to breathe on his own and suffered from multi-organ system failure. In addition, doctors at Kessler determined that he was “significantly” brain injured. Although Patrick improved somewhat during the month of April, by early May, he again experienced severe infections and pneumonia. On May 30, 1996, Patrick was removed from the ventilator and two hours later was pronounced dead. The Deputy Middlesex County Medical Examiner determined that the cause of death was sepsis and bronchopneumonia resulting from multiple injuries from the motor vehicle accident. It was undisputed at trial that Patrick had expressed to his family a preference not to be kept alive on life support. D was charged with first-degree aggravated manslaughter. D filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, contending that the removal of the ventilator constituted an independent intervening cause that insulated defendant from criminal liability. The trial court denied that motion, holding that the removal of life support was not an intervening cause and stating its intention to instruct the jury to that effect at trial. Consistent with that intention, the trial court included in its jury charge on causation an instruction concerning intervening cause and a victim’s determination to remove life support. In pertinent part, the trial court instructed the jury: “the removal of life supports, in this case, a ventilator, is not sufficient intervening cause to relieve the defendant of criminal liability.” The trial court added that the causal link is not broken “as long as you find that the death was the natural result of the defendant’s actions.” The jury acquitted D of aggravated manslaughter but convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree vehicular homicide. D appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that removal of life support was not an intervening cause of death was the “natural result” of defendant’s actions. The Appellate Division agreed and reversed the conviction. The State Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certification.