State v. Miranda

794 A.2d 506 (2002)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D lived with his girlfriend and her two children. D was twenty-one years old, his girlfriend was sixteen, her son was two, and her daughter, the victim, in this case, was four months old. D was not the biological father of either child, but he considered himself to be their stepfather. During a hospital visit for choking, it was determined that the victim had multiple rib fractures that were approximately two to three weeks old, two skull fractures that were approximately seven to ten days old, a brachial plexus injury to her left arm, a rectal tear that was actively 'oozing blood' and bilateral subconjunctival nasal hemorrhages. The trial court determined that the injuries had not been the result of an accident, a fall, events that took place at the time of the child's birth, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, a blocked air passageway or the child choking on milk. The trial court found that the injuries, many of which created a risk of death, had been caused by great and deliberate force. The court also determined that anyone who saw the child would have had to notice these injuries, the consequent deformities, and her reactions. The trial court found that D had been aware of the various bruises on her right cheek and the subconjunctival nasal hemorrhages, as well as the swelling of the child's head, that D knew she had suffered a rectal tear, as well as rib fractures posteriorly on the left and right sides, and that he was aware that there existed a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the child was exposed to conduct that created a risk of death. Despite this knowledge, D 'failed to act to help or aid [the child] by promptly notifying authorities of her injuries, taking her for medical care, removing her from her circumstances and guarding her from future abuses. 'The trial court concluded that D had a legal duty to protect the health and well-being of the child based on the undisputed facts that he had established a familial relationship with the child's mother and her two children, that he had voluntarily assumed responsibility for the care and welfare of both children, and that he considered himself the victim's stepfather. D was found guilty of one count of risk of injury to a child and six counts of assault in the first degree. 'The court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years imprisonment.' D appealed. The Appellate Court, which affirmed the conviction for risk of injury to a child, but reversed the assault convictions, concluding that the defendant had no legal duty to act under the circumstances of this case. The State Supreme court concluded that D had established a familial relationship with the victim's mother and her two children, had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the children, and had assumed a legal duty to protect the victim from abuse. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and remanded the case to that court for consideration of the defendant's claims of insufficient evidence and 'any constitutional claims of due process and double jeopardy arising as a result of this decision. On remand, the Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of conviction of risk of injury and reversed the judgment of conviction of six counts of assault in the first degree under and remanded the case with direction to render judgment of not guilty as to the assault counts. The Appellate Court concluded that convicting the defendant of assault in the first degree under would violate the defendant's due process rights because a person of ordinary intelligence in the defendant's circumstances would not have known that he had a duty to protect the child. This appeal followed.