Two criminal cases consolidated for purposes of this decision. Each defendant's conviction was based on eyewitness identification evidence. Noris and Sherl Hilde embarked on a weekend camping trip. When they arrived at the campsite with their trailer, they found D's yellow truck in their parking space and discovered that D had moved into their tent. d apologized and told them that he thought that it had been abandoned. D gathered his gear, loaded it into his truck, and moved to a vacant campsite nearby. Later that evening, Sherl was shot in the chest with a large caliber hunting rifle as she stood at the window of the trailer. Noris called 9-1-1 but was shot while speaking with the 9-1-1 operator, and he died shortly thereafter. The 9-1-1 dispatcher called back and spoke with Sherl, who told the dispatcher that she and her husband had been shot, that she did not know who shot them, and that 'they' - referring to the shooter or shooters - had wanted the Hildes' truck. Sherl was transported to a helicopter, which flew her to a hospital. Sherl was rambling and hysterical while en route to the hospital. Sherl continued to refer to the perpetrator as 'they,' and stated alternately at various times that the shooter was the man who had been at their campsite earlier in the day, that the pilot of the helicopter was the shooter, and that she did not know who the perpetrator was and had not seen 'their' face or faces. The second day after the shooting, she was heavily medicated and sedated, and could not speak due to a breathing tube in her throat. She was shown a black-and-white photo lineup that included a picture of D after he volunteered to the police that he had encountered the Hildes at their campsite on the morning of the day they were shot. When the detective asked whether she saw in the lineup the person who shot her, she shook her head no. The detective then, using leading questions, on whether she had seen the person who shot her earlier in the day, whether he had been in their tent, and whether he drove a yellow truck. She nodded 'yes' in response to those questions. Two weeks later she told detectives that after her husband was shot, the perpetrator had entered the trailer and put a pillow over her face. She said that she did not know who he was and that she could not see the man because it was dark and because of the pillow. Two weeks later she told the detectives that, notwithstanding the pillow over her face, she had briefly seen the man who came to her trailer after the shootings. She was again unable to pick Ds photograph out of a lineup. She said that the perpetrator was wearing a dark shirt and a baseball cap, but did not tell police that it was the same man that she and Mr. Hilde had encountered at their campsite earlier that day. A week later one of the detectives and Sherl reviewed her answers to the leading questions that she had been asked at the first interview. She had no recollection of that interview. She told the detectives that she now believed that the perpetrator was the man who had been in their camp earlier in the day. She declined to view a profile lineup, telling the detective that she did not think she would be able to pick her attacker out of the lineup. The detectives then informed her that 'the man that you've identified is the person that we have in custody,' and identified defendant Samuel Lawson (D) by name. She saw a newspaper photo of D and also detectives showed her D’s pictures on numerous occasions. She was then able to pick D's picture out of the lineup. At trial, she testified as though she was 100% sure it was D and gave details to the jury. D moved to strike that identification on the ground that it had been tainted by suggestive police procedures. The motion was denied. D was convicted on five counts of aggravated murder, three counts of attempted aggravated murder, and two counts of first-degree robbery. D appealed. The court of appeals applied the two-stop Classen procedure. The court was required to determine whether the underlying identification process had either been suggestive or had otherwise departed needlessly from the procedures designed to avoid such suggestiveness. If the court determined that the process had been suggestive, then the court was required to determine (1) whether the witness had based the identification at issue on an independent source separate from the suggestive elements, or (2) whether other aspects of the identification substantially excluded the risk that it had been influenced by the suggestive elements. Classen identified a set of nonexclusive considerations to be used in determining whether an identification had a source independent of the otherwise suggestive procedure. Those factors included: The opportunity that the witness had to clearly view the persons involved in the crime and the attention that he or she gave to their identifying features. The timing and completeness of the description given by the witness after the event. The degree of certainty expressed by the witness in describing the persons involved in the crime and making subsequent identifications. The lapse of time between the original observation and the subsequent identification. It held under the totality of the circumstances the identification had been independent of the suggestive procedures. D appealed.
Officer Gomez responded to a theft complaint at a local Safeway store. Two store employees gave their detailed statements as to what occurred and how they personally and up close interfaced with the two suspects. They were a large male and a small male, both Native American, and both in their mid-20s. The larger suspect was between six feet and six feet two inches tall, weighed approximately 220 pounds, and wore a white tank top and baggy blue jeans. The smaller suspect was approximately five feet tall, weighed about 110 pounds, and wore a long black coat with a hood, baggy blue pants, and a backpack. Officer Gomez observed two men at a nearby fast food restaurant that he believed matched the descriptions given earlier by the Safeway store employees. The taller of the men was defendant James (D); the shorter man was Manuel Guerrero. Both men appeared to be inebriated. Both men denied having been to Safeway or having driven a motor vehicle at any time that day. Officer Gomez searched Guerrero's backpack and discovered one unopened 40-ounce bottle of Steel Reserve 211 malt liquor and a denim jacket, which D put on. Officer Gomez asked D and Guerrero if they would be willing to go to the Safeway with him to 'clear the matter up.' Both men consented and were handcuffed and driven to the Safeway store. The clerk and the assistant manager approached. Guerrero stood handcuffed by the police cars while D remained seated in the back seat of one of the cars with the door open; his hands were cuffed behind his back and he was wearing his denim jacket and a pair of sunglasses. The employees 'both positively identified the subjects as the persons who stole the beer.' D was charged with second-degree robbery, fourth-degree assault, carrying a concealed weapon, harassment, and third-degree theft. D filed a motion to suppress both the out-of-court identification and any in-court eyewitness identification that might be made by the employees, arguing that the identification procedure in the Safeway parking lot was unduly suggestive and unreliable, violating federal due process protections and this court's ruling in Classen. D argued that the showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive. D claimed there was insufficient indicia of reliability to substantially exclude the risk of misidentification, pointing out that (1) Native Americans make up a large portion of the Pendleton community, which borders a reservation; and (2) the witnesses' description of the perpetrators was vague, focusing on generic items of clothing, and omitting key details like the red bandanas hanging from D's beltline and D's hair color, hairstyle, and facial hair. The trial court found that the identification procedure was suggestive under the first part of Classen. The court concluded that the identification had been based on sources independent of the suggestive procedures. The witnesses gave Officer Gomez a very good description of the suspects. One was quite large. One was quite small. They both appeared to be Indian. Their clothes were identified with considerable specificity. They indicated that when they left, they had stolen beer of an unusual size; 40-ounce bottles, and unusual brands, at least in this Court's experience. D was found guilty and appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the identification evidence was properly admitted under Classen. D appealed.