State v. Hess

684 N.W.2d 414 (2004)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

On April 1, 1898, Walker et al. conveyed their interests in the real property so long as the said strips of land shall be used for Right of Way and Railway purposes; but to cease and terminate if the Railway is removed from the said strips. Eventually, in 1985, BNRC discontinued service on 193.12 miles of its railroad line. In 1988, the Minnesota Legislature authorized the DNR to purchase the corridor between Baxter and Bemidji in order to create the Paul Bunyan State Trail. BNRC subsequently conveyed the corridor to the DNR by a quitclaim deed dated September 13, 1991, which deed was recorded December 31, 1991. Consideration for the corridor was $1.526 million. The DNR opened the Paul Bunyan State Trail for public use in December 1991. On August 10, 1977, the Sandberg (D) acquired a parcel of land. At the time of this acquisition, the railroad line was still operational. On July 29, 1993, the Sandbergs acquired an adjoining parcel of land that is bisected by the Paul Bunyan State Trail. On October 11, 1995, the Sandbergs acquired a third parcel of land east of and bordering the trail. The trail was visible and open for public use at the time of the Sandbergs' second and third acquisitions. On December 8, 1992, Hess (D) acquired approximately 210 acres of real property. The trail was visible and open for public use at the time that Hess acquired his property. In October 1998, Ds began blockading the Paul Bunyan State Trail where it crossed their respective properties. P initiated this quiet title action, seeking a declaration that the DNR owns the parts of the Paul Bunyan State Trail being blockaded by Ds. The court granted P's motion for summary judgment and concluded that P owns the property in question in fee simple. The district court concluded that the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed conveyed a fee simple determinable, subject to the limitation 'so long as the said strips of land shall be used for Right of Way and Railway purposes; but to cease and terminate if the Railway is removed from the said strips.' Having concluded that the interest conveyed in 1898 was a fee simple determinable, the court went on to conclude that the P owns the subject property in fee simple. It did so because notice of a claim to the contrary was not given within 40 years of the 1898 deed; thus, all limitations on the conveyance were extinguished in accordance with the Marketable Title Act. The court of appeals reversed the district court. Ps contend that the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed created an easement for a right of way rather than a fee simple determinable.