State v. Davis

Facts

Davis' (D) daughter was 15 months old when she died. The girl lived with her mother, Ecklund, and several of Ecklund's other children. Ecklund and D were not married and lived apart. The victim stayed with D overnight at his home from time to time. Ecklund, the victim, and Ecklund's other children vacationed in Mexico and California in the middle of June 2002. During the trip, the victim fell off a motel bed. Ecklund told police later that she 'couldn't get there fast enough' and that the victim hit the 'top of her head' in the fall. Ecklund testified that the victim exhibited no signs of distress after the fall. Shortly after the family's return to Oregon, on June 24, the victim had an overnight visit with D. She returned to Ecklund's care the following day. On June 25, Ecklund noticed that the victim was not feeling well; she was vomiting and her eyes were 'glassy.' Payne, a registered nurse, stopped by and examine the victim. The victim was unresponsive. The trial court excluded as hearsay Payne's testimony that she had told Ecklund that the victim's condition looked just like that of Payne's daughter when she had suffered a traumatic brain injury years before. Payne tested the victim for dehydration by pinching the victim's skin and noticed that the victim's eyes were glassy and somewhat 'rolled up' in her head; Payne recommended that Ecklund have the victim examined by a doctor. During her testimony at trial, Ecklund did not recall Payne's visit or recommendation. Ecklund took the victim to Santiam Hospital a few hours after Payne's examination. The victim was evaluated, treated for dehydration and a viral infection, and given intravenous fluids. Her symptoms resolved, and the victim returned home the next morning. On June 29, around 7:00 p.m., D picked up the victim for an overnight visit. The victim was fussing and crying but showed no other signs of illness or injury. D gave the victim a bath and changed her diaper. He then began doing some household chores while the victim, another child of D, and d's small dog played together in the garage. Dt returned to the garage and found the victim lying on her side on the floor. D testified that the other child told him that the small dog had knocked over the victim. D picked up the victim but decided that she seemed unhurt. At 10:00 p.m. after eating a few pieces of pineapple off a pizza the victim spat up or vomited, had a blank affect, and had become limp. D called Ecklund at 10:58 and she found the victim limp and unresponsive and told D to call 9-1-1. Defendant made the call and told the dispatcher that the victim had recently eaten pineapple and spat up and that he was concerned about a possible allergic reaction. Paramedics found the victim unresponsive but breathing, with a body temperature of 92.7 degrees. They noticed a small bruise on her forehead and some bruising on her abdomen. Ecklund did not tell them about the victim's visit to Santiam Hospital several days previously. At the hospital, Ecklund did not mention her discussion with Payne, the victim's visit to the hospital four days earlier, or the victim's treatment for dehydration. Testing revealed that the victim had a subdural hematoma and needed surgery to relieve the resulting pressure on the brain. Doctors performed surgery to relieve the pressure on the victim's brain. Subsequent testing showed that the victim's brain was no longer functioning, and she was taken off life support on June 30, 2002. The autopsy revealed, among other things, that the victim had about a quart and a half of blood in her abdomen, which was due to a tear in the mesentery, the lining of the abdominal cavity that connects to parts of the small intestine. The victim's brain was swollen, the subdural hematoma on the right side of the victim's head had been removed by the surgeons who had tried to save her, and the victim had retinal hemorrhaging and bleeding at the base of the optic nerve. The medical examiner later testified that the retinal hemorrhage and brain injury were caused by acceleration and deceleration of the victim's head, which would have been caused either by violent shaking, a violent shake followed by a slam, or a single slam. The medical examiner also stated that the injuries were 'acute' and had to have occurred within 24 to 36 hours of the victim's death; according to him, the microscopic evidence was not consistent with an older abdominal injury. The cause of the victim's death was homicide. The victim had suffered other injuries in the weeks and months before her death. Among other things, the victim had healing fractures to three ribs and a healing fracture on the femur, as well as possible old fractures on her tibia and fibula. D was charged with murder by abuse and manslaughter. An expert's opinion was that the victim had suffered child abuse. The victim's entire medical history was admitted into evidence. The jury found D guilty of manslaughter but could not reach a decision on the remaining charges, including murder by abuse. A mistrial was declared from juror misconduct and a new trial was held. P's theory of the case was that the victim died on June 30, 2002, due to head and abdominal injuries that D intentionally inflicted on the victim on a particular date - on or between June 29 and 30, 2002. D reported to the court that his experts had reached the conclusion that the fatal abdominal and brain injuries had been inflicted not on June 29 or 30 but at least several days before the victim's death and that the victim died on June 30 as a result of a rebleed of the earlier injuries. The experts were going to testify that the victim had been subjected to physical abuse throughout her life. Evidence of that abuse, D contended, was admissible to explain the basis for the experts' conclusions. The trial court excluded the evidence of prior physical abuse. It was held to be not relevant because D could not tie the prior abuse, including the healing fractures, to the abdominal and brain injuries that caused the victim's death under Rule 403. P presented witnesses who testified that the abdominal injury would have been quite painful, the victim would not have been able to eat afterward, and that the head injury would have produced immediate and obvious symptoms - the victim would have lost coordination and she would not have been able to eat or swallow. Those facts led the medical examiner to conclude that the abdominal injury occurred after the victim ate pieces of pineapple on the pizza that was delivered after 10:00 pm on June 29 and that the head injury occurred at some time thereafter. D's experts testified that the abdominal injury showed microscopic signs of healing that would not have been evident unless the injury were at least several days old. They testified that CT scans and x-rays showed evidence of an older trauma to the dura around the brain and that photos taken at the autopsy revealed that clotting had begun to occur there. One expert testified that the brain injury was at least five days old. They opined that the abdominal injury worsened over time, with the mesentery rupturing and the bleeding consequently accelerating, causing coagulopathy, or an inability of the body to clot properly. That, in turn, caused the existing subdural hematoma to rebleed, leading, ultimately, to the victim's death. D's experts testified that the child could have appeared normal after suffering the earlier abdominal injury and the brain injury, including eating, drinking, and eliminating normally. They stated that the abdominal injury might not have caused constant pain, after the initial blow, because the mesentery tear was in the back of the abdomen, and, if the mesentery had ruptured on the night of the victim's death, the victim would have experienced unquenchable thirst, which would have driven her to eat the pineapple from the pizza. They testified that the early symptoms of a deteriorating abdominal trauma were exactly the same as the symptoms with which the victim presented at the hospital four days earlier, on June 25, leading that expert to conclude that the victim already had the abdominal injury at that time. D attempted to get Payne's evidence admitted. The court ruled that Payne's statements to Ecklund that the victim reminded her or her daughter were hearsay, and, to the extent that that testimony might have been admissible nonetheless to show its effect on the listener, the court found that it was unclear what Ecklund might have understood Payne to mean. It rejected D's argument that Payne's statement that the victim looked like her daughter when her daughter's brain was swelling was admissible as lay opinion testimony under Rule 701. D was convicted and appealed. The Court of Appeals rejected D's challenges to the trial court's rulings respecting the victim's prior injuries and hospital visits and Payne's lay opinion that the victim looked like she may have been suffering from a brain injury on June 25. It reversed the trial court's ruling excluding Payne's testimony that she told Ecklund on June 25 that the victim reminded her of her daughter. The statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, viz., that the victim reminded Payne of her daughter but to show that Payne told Ecklund, in effect, that the victim looked like she was suffering from a brain injury and that Ecklund did not report that concern to hospital staff later that day, or to the paramedics who were called to D's house on June 29, or to any of the doctors who treated the victim on the night of her death. The Appeals Court stated that the proffered evidence assists in establishing the relevance of other evidence, namely, the testimony of the paramedics and emergency room doctors who said that Ecklund never told them about the possibility of an earlier brain injury. That evidence supports the inference that Ecklund was hiding her knowledge about the victim's prior injuries. The evidence is relevant, and the court erred in ruling that it should be excluded.' P now seeks a review of that decision, arguing that evidence of Payne's statement to Ecklund on June 25 and Ecklund's reaction to that statement were not offered for their truth - that is, that the victim, in fact, had a brain injury on June 25, 2002 - and, therefore, were not relevant. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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