State v. Danielson

814 N.W.2d 401 (2012)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

D worked as a mechanic and automobile painter for Rocket Lube. Rocket fired Danielson in 2006, claiming that D stole auto parts and did not remit checks for work done by D on vehicles belonging to Dr. Tom Cox. D was indicted on one count of grand theft. P argued that the checks from Dr. Cox were the property of Rocket Lube. D testified that he and Dr. Cox had a private agreement and that the checks belonged to him. Dr. Cox felt that Rocket Lube was taking advantage of him and thus, Dr. Cox asked D to work on Dr. Cox's vehicles in D's spare time to save expenses. D testified that he replaced a front clutch pack in the automatic transmission of Dr. Cox's 1950 Studebaker. Dr. Cox admitted that he felt that Rocket Lube was overcharging him, but he testified that he thought that D was still acting as an agent of Rocket Lube when performing the work on Dr. Cox's vehicles. The jury found D not guilty of grand theft. A grand jury indicted D on one count of perjury alleging that D committed perjury by testifying falsely that 'he had replaced parts inside the transmission of Dr. Tom Cox's 1950 Studebaker pick-up truck.' The indictment alleged that D did not actually perform this work. D moved to dismiss the perjury indictment as a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, arguing that the jury acquittal was a final determination that he did perform the work in question. The trial court agreed and granted D's motion to dismiss. The court reversed and remanded on appeal, holding that 'D has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the jury's not guilty verdict necessarily included an implicit factual finding that he performed the work on the 1950 Studebaker.' On remand, the jury found D guilty of perjury. D appealed. D argues that whether certain repair work was done or not done was not material to the grand theft trial, and thus, any alleged false statement does not constitute perjury. D asserts that the alleged false statement could have been a result of faulty memory or mistake. P claims that materiality is an issue for the jury to decide and contends that D's testimony about repair work was material to the grand theft trial because it bolstered and affected D's credibility and his claim of right defense. P asserts that perjury is a general intent crime and alternatively argues that even if perjury is a specific intent crime, D had the specific intent to make a false statement of material fact.