State v. Campbell

19 N.E.3d 271 (Ind. 2014)

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Nature of the Case

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Facts

A long-simmering contentious relationship between neighbors, arising out of a property easement dispute, resulted in a physical altercation during which D and Jean and Alva Kincaid. D entered their home beating and seriously injuring both. D was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder, burglary resulting in serious bodily injury. D lost his first appeal and has now filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. D contended that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for (i) engaging in improper voir dire examination during jury selection, and (ii) failing to object to a jury instruction regarding the definition of 'intentionally.' At the conclusion of the trial, the jury received final instructions from the trial court and retired to deliberate. The jury asked the bailiff a follow-up question, namely: 'they want to know the definition of intent.' After the trial court determined that it could give additional instructions, trial counsel requested that the definition of 'intentionally' from the pattern jury instructions be given without repeating other final instructions: 'they had a simple question and a good question. I would like to request that just the pattern definition of intentionally be read.' They read the following to the jury: Indiana code 35-41-2-2, intentional is defined by statute as follows. A person engages in conduct intentionally if when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also to cause the result. D contends that the supplementary instruction given contained an incorrect statement of the law. D referred to the second sentence of the instruction, namely: 'If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also to cause the result.' The court denied the relief. D appealed.