Sheriff's deputies discovered the bodies of Paulette, Bernard, Diane, and Richard Brom on the second floor of the Brom family home. All four individuals had sustained numerous gashes in the head and upper body. Police subsequently found a blood-stained ax in the basement that forensic tests indicated was used to kill all four victims. Tests also revealed the ax handle bore D's palm and fingerprints. D was arrested in connection with the deaths of his parents and siblings. Because he was 16 years old at the time, D was initially charged in the juvenile justice system. After a much-publicized reference hearing and appeal, D was referred for prosecution as an adult. D moved the trial court for a change of venue. The court denied Ds motion but noted both its intention to permit thorough voir dire and its willingness to entertain a renewed motion for a change of venue once jury selection was completed. D pleaded both not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness, and his trial proceeded in two phases. Phase one was limited to whether D was guilty of first or second-degree murder in connection with the deaths of his parents and siblings. D made an offer of proof requesting permission to introduce expert psychiatric testimony regarding D's capacity to premeditate his actions. The trial court denied this request and the defense rested without offering testimony. The jury was instructed that it should not consider evidence of appellant's mental illness in its phase one deliberations and found D guilty of four counts of murder in the first degree. In phase two D bore the burden of proving his legal, mental illness by a preponderance of the evidence. One psychiatrist concluded that D did not understand that killing his parents and siblings was wrong when he did so and that, therefore, he was legally insane. The state offered expert testimony from four psychiatrists. Two concluded that D was not legally insane at the time he committed the murders and two did not offer an opinion as to his legal, mental illness. All of the experts agreed, however, that D suffered some form of mental illness or impairment. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to four counts of murder in the first degree. On appeal D among other issues, D claimed that in prohibiting expert psychiatric testimony from the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial, the trial court precluded his defense as to the element of premeditation and thereby denied him due process of law.