State v. Bowens

532 A.2d 215 (1987)

Facts

Bowens (D) and Rivers (D1) were separate appeals on the same issue, the failure of the trial court to give an imperfect self-defense charge. 


D1's incident began as a 'pick-up' in a gay bar. Prior to arriving at the bar, D1 consumed substantial amounts of alcohol as well as some cocaine and marijuana. While at the bar he drank more alcohol. D1 and victim subsequently left the bar to go to a restaurant where D1 worked. They went to a backroom area and engaged in sex. After they re-entered the restaurant area, the two became involved in an argument over D1's attention to others. The victim allegedly picked up a knife and threatened to use it on D1. When the victim moved away, D1reached behind a counter and picked up a kitchen knife. When the victim came back at him, D1said that he thought the victim was about to attack. D1 stabbed the victim in the stomach, causing his death. The court refused to charge the jury on imperfect self-defense. It did charge the jury with respect to the possible effect of alcohol on his state of mind and the reckless manslaughter offenses. The jury acquitted D1of murder but found him guilty of aggravated manslaughter, unlawful possession of a knife, and possession of a knife for an unlawful purpose.

For over a year, Booker had threatened D on many occasions, often brandishing a knife. D knew that Booker had a reputation for violence, particularly when Booker was drunk. On the day of the killing, Booker, apparently drunk, approached D in a manner that caused D to fear that Booker would attack him with the knife. D showed Booker his knife, and the victim retreated, but then proceeded to follow him. When Booker was about two feet away, D, believing he was going to be stabbed by Booker, and intending to stop Booker, stabbed him. At trial, the court denied D's request for a jury charge on imperfect self-defense and instructed the jury on murder, manslaughter committed in the heat of passion, and justification based on self-defense. The jury found D guilty of first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment with the required thirty-year parole disqualifier. The Appellate Division reversed, finding prejudicial error in the trial court's failure to charge the jury on aggravated and reckless manslaughter. The State (P) appealed.