Nature of the Case
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Facts
Prior to the trial of this matter to the court, the state (P) moved to suppress evidence offered by D that 1. D's cruise control stuck in the 'accelerate' position causing the car to accelerate beyond the posted speed limit. 2. D attempted to deactivate the cruise control by hitting the off button and the coast button and tapping the brakes. These actions were not immediately successful in deactivating the cruise control. Subsequent to the date of this incident, D had the defective cruise control repaired. The trial court sustained the motion, thus precluding D from presenting the proffered evidence as a defense. D presented no defense and P's evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached. D was found guilty of driving in excess of the posted speed limit, and, also, that defendant was the 'driver' of the car as defined by K.S.A. 8-1416. The sentence of $10 and costs was suspended pending this appeal. D readily concedes that a violation of the speeding statute is an absolute liability offense when read in light of the absolute liability statute which provides: 'A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. . . .' D admits that this statute does away with the necessity of proving intent to commit the misdemeanor and, further, that any evidence of the defective cruise control would be inadmissible if introduced merely to negate an intent or culpable state of mind on the part of the motorist. His contention is that the evidence was offered to show that his speeding was not a voluntary act and, therefore, there was no criminal liability. D suggests that even though the charge against him was an absolute liability offense per K.S.A. 21-3204, the state must prove that he acted voluntarily.
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