State v. Bagby

522 P.3d 982 (2021)

Facts

D went to a fraternity party with his three friends: Solomon Cooper, Shyla Roberson, and Kailah Crisostomo. The four were enrolled students at nearby universities. Crisostomo and D had been dating for a couple of weeks, but that night was the first time Crisostomo met Roberson and Cooper. The group spent the evening drinking at D’s home before walking down the street to a crowded fraternity party where they continued to drink, dance, and socialize. Crisostomo separated from D at the party. D asked Roberson to check on her. Roberson found Crisostomo in the fraternity’s gender-neutral bathroom crying hysterically and saying she did not want to go back to D. In response, Roberson offered to let Crisostomo come back to her home. When neither of the women returned, D became concerned and went to look for them. He found them in the same bathroom stall. Roberson insisted that he leave and that she would take Crisostomo home, D became angry and began to yell and shake the stall door. Austin Davis, a bystander, intervened and attempted to get D to leave the bathroom, D punched Davis, knocking him unconscious. Cooper eventually came to the bathroom and removed D from the party. Two witnesses, Sabrina Manzo and Leann Griffith, were present in the bathroom as these events unfolded. Roberson and Crisostomo also left and walked toward Roberson’s apartment. Roberson called the police to report what had occurred at the fraternity party. They arrived at Roberson’s apartment, and Crisostomo fell asleep on the couch. D attempted to contact Roberson and eventually left the following voice message: (Inaudible) when I see you I will break your fucking jaw because you just made me look like a fucking (inaudible) with my friends and I’m not bullshitting with you. Get a restraining order against me now, because again when I come to you, I will fuck you up, when I see you. Ten minutes later D arrived at Roberson’s apartment, forced the door open, entered the apartment, and began yelling at Crisostomo. Roberson called the police for the second time. Crisostomo woke up and retreated to the bedroom. Elizabeth Nelson and Daniel Robinett heard shouting and went to Roberson’s apartment to investigate. Police officers arrived several minutes later and found D standing outside of the apartment building, where they arrested him. D was charged with residential burglary, fourth-degree assault, third-degree malicious mischief, and harassment. D was the only Black person at his trial other than his friend, Cooper. The judge, the lawyers, nearly all of the witnesses, and the entire jury panel were white. The prosecutor repeatedly asked witnesses to identify D by his “nationality.” Throughout the trial, no one objected to questions or remarks about nationality, race, or ethnicity. Defense counsel also asked the witnesses to refer to the individuals involved by their nationality when describing what had occurred the night of the incidents. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel asked the witnesses about other individuals involved in the incidents using other identifying characteristics,  such as hair color. D's citizenship status was not part of the facts of the case. D did not deny that he was the person involved in the relevant incidents. D’s theory at trial was self-defense and diminished capacity by voluntary intoxication. The only issue at trial was whether his conduct constituted a crime. The prosecutor also repeatedly referred to Nelson and Robinett, two white witnesses, as “citizens,” despite a lack of evidence in the record or other discussion regarding their citizenship status. D was found guilty of residential burglary, fourth-degree assault, and harassment but not guilty of malicious mischief and appealed. D argued the prosecutor’s use of race and the term “nationality” evoked racial bias in a manner that constituted prosecutorial misconduct and negatively impacted his trial, requiring reversal of his convictions. P conceded that its use of the term “nationality” was incorrect but argued that it was not an intentional appeal to racial bias. The Court of Appeals rejected D’s arguments and affirmed the trial court. The Court of Appeals reasoned D had to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct was so “flagrant and ill-intentioned” that a curative instruction would not have alleviated the resulting prejudice. The court also determined that D’s failure to object during the trial precluded any relief. D appealed.