Lead poisoning constitutes a public health crisis that has plagued and continues to plague this country, particularly its children. Contact with low levels of lead may lead to 'permanent learning disabilities, reduced concentration and attentiveness and behavior problems, problems which may persist and adversely affect the child's chances for success in school and life.' Congress enacted chapter 63 of title 42 of the United States Code, the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act (LPPPA), a law aimed at studying the effects of childhood lead exposure and eliminating lead-based paint from federally owned or federally financed housing. Finally, in 1978, the Consumer Product Safety Commission banned the sale of residential paint containing more than 0.06 percent lead. See Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing Lead-Containing Paints, 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (2008); see also Office of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning Prevention, 61 Fed. Reg. at 29171. The General Assembly enacted the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (LPPA), chapter 24.6 of title 23, which required RIDOH to implement various programs, including statewide blood-screening programs, lead-poisoning prevention programs, and educational programs. The General Assembly later enacted the Lead Hazard Mitigation Act (LHMA) (P.L. 2002, ch. 187, § 3), G.L. 1956 chapter 128.1 of title 42, to help identify and correct lead hazards in the state. On October 12, 1999, the Attorney General, on behalf of P filed a ten-count complaint against eight former lead pigment manufacturers, John Doe corporations, and the LIA. Ds moved to dismiss all counts of the state's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Ds asserted that they did not control the lead pigment at the time it caused harm to Rhode Island children and that, therefore, they cannot be held liable for public nuisance. The court denied the motion. Eventually, after a second trial, Ds were found guilty. After the verdict, Ds renewed their motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 and moved alternatively for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial justice denied both these motions.