State Ex Rel. Verizon West Virginia, Inc. v. Matish

740 S.E. 2d 84 (2013)

Purchase the Printed Copy at bsmsphd.com

Nature of the Case

To access this section all you need to do is click here and register.

Facts

Steptoe filed a lawsuit against Verizon (D) on behalf of a former Verizon employee (Rowh) alleging wrongful termination and violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. Years later, Steptoe filed a similar lawsuit on behalf of another Verizon employee (Radcliffe). Both of these individuals had worked at Verizon's call center in Clarksburg, West Virginia. In the Rowh case, the parties entered into an agreed protective order to secure the confidentiality of certain documents disclosed in discovery. A similar agreed protective order was entered in the Radcliff proceedings, with the additional stipulation that documents produced in Rowh, and subject to the protective order therein, nevertheless could also be used in Radcliff in an effort to avoid unnecessary costs of duplication. Both the lawsuits were resolved through the entry of confidential settlement agreements. The confidential settlement agreements permitted the parties to reveal protected information as necessary to comply with a court order or other obligation imposed by law. Steptoe then filed lawsuits on behalf of nine other former Verizon employees. Steptoe filed two class action lawsuits alleging the same claims. Rector, a Steptoe attorney who had represented the plaintiffs in the two prior, settled cases against Verizon, indicated that he might use some of the documents produced in discovery in the Rowh proceedings in the current cases. D did not agree to the entry of a protective order with provisions similar to those contained in the Radcliff order. D then moved for Steptoe's disqualification based upon Rector's stated intention to use the Rowh discovery documents in his representation of the new plaintiffs and his additional indication that he might call the former plaintiff employees as witnesses in the current cases. In response, Steptoe stated it would produce the documents in discovery if it had to without reference to the prior cases and that all the new plaintiffs stated that they understood that Rector's representation of them may be limited by his prior representation of the initial two plaintiff employees in the Rowh and Radcliff cases but that they nevertheless want to continue to be represented by Steptoe. The circuit court found Steptoe was not disqualified because Rector and new plaintiffs had submitted affidavits accepting the limitations of representation. Because Steptoe had neither consulted with its former clients nor obtained their consent to its continued representation of the new plaintiffs the circuit court held its ruling on D's motion to disqualify in abeyance for twenty days to permit Steptoe to consult with its former clients and obtain their consent to the continued representation. The court expressed its concern that granting D's disqualification motion might infringe upon attorney Rector's right to practice law. Steptoe filed consents from its two former clients, and the court denied D's motion to disqualify.