Stoyanoff (P) applied for a permit to build an 'ultra-modern' house to be used as a single-family residence in the City of Ladue. This house was to be built in one of the finer suburbs of St. Louis where all of the houses were conventional two-story buildings. Plans and specifications were submitted. The design was unusual but the building complied with all existing building and zoning regulations and ordinances of the City. The Architectural Board denied approval of P's plans. Almost the entire neighborhood consisted of vanilla type family homes of an upscale quality using Colonial, French, and Tudor designs. Ordinance 131 allowed the Architectural Board to approve plans and designs to conform to certain minimum aesthetic architectural standards. P sued alleging that the ordinance was invalid, illegal and void because it was unconstitutionally vague and provided for no standard nor uniform rule by which to guide the Board and thus the city had acted in excess of statutory authority. P filed a motion for summary judgment. D asserted that the ordinances were a reasonable exercise of the city’s governmental, legislative, and police powers. D then plead that the description of the proposed residence as unusual was the understatement of the year; the proposed house was a monstrosity of grotesque design that would seriously impair the value of the property in the neighborhood and would conflict with the traditional architecture of the surrounding neighborhood. A developer’s affidavit stated that the house would clash with and not be in conformity with any other house in the entire neighborhood and that if the house were allowed to be built, it would have a substantial adverse effect upon market values. Exhibits of homes in the neighborhood were provided to the court. Photographic exhibits of P’s planned residence were also included. P contends that the architectural statutes were invalid and unconstitutional and were both unreasonable and an arbitrary exercise of power and invalid as an unlawful delegation of legislative powers to the Architectural Board. P contends that sections 89.020 or 89.040 and other provisions mentioned do not give a city authority to regulate architectural design and appearance. P contends that there is no provision for such a Board in the enabling legislation. P relies on the Magidson case. The trial court held that the ordinances deprived P of the use of his property without due process of law and ordered the city to issue P a building permit. D appealed.