Smith v. City Of Salem

Facts

P is employed by D as a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department. P worked for the Fire Department for seven years without any negative incidents. P - biologically and by birth a male - is a transsexual and has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which the American Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an individual's sexual organs and sexual identity. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 576-582 (4th ed. 2000). P is employed by D as a lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department. P worked for the Fire Department for seven years without any negative incidents. P - biologically and by birth a male - is a transsexual and has been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which the American Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an individual's sexual organs and sexual identity. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 576-582 (4th ed. 2000). After being diagnosed P began 'expressing a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis' - including at work - in accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID. P's co-workers began questioning him about his appearance and commenting that his appearance and mannerisms were not 'masculine enough.' P notified his immediate supervisor, Thomas Eastek (D), about his GID diagnosis and treatment. He also informed Eastek (D) of the likelihood that his treatment would eventually include a complete physical transformation from male to female. Smith had approached Eastek (D) in order to answer any questions Eastek might have concerning his appearance and manner and so that Eastek (D) could address Smith's co-workers' comments and inquiries. P specifically asked Eastek (D), and Eastek (D) promised, not to divulge the substance of their conversation to any of his superiors, particularly to Walter Greenamyer (D), Chief of the Fire Department. Eastek (D) told Greenamyer (D) about P's behavior and his GID. Greenamyer (D) then met with C. Brooke Zellers (D), the Law Director for D, with the intention of using P's transsexualism and its manifestations as a basis for terminating his employment. On April 18, 2001, Greenamyer (D) and Zellers (D) arranged a meeting of D's executive body to discuss P and devise a plan for terminating his employment. The executive body included Defendants Larry D. DeJane, Salem's mayor; James A. Armeni, Salem's auditor; and Joseph S. Julian, Salem's service director. During the meeting, Greenamyer, DeJane, and Zellers (Ds) agreed to arrange for the D Civil Service Commission to require P to undergo three separate psychological The hope was that P would either resign or refuse to comply. If he refused to comply, Ds figured they could terminate P's employment on the grounds of insubordination. Willard, who remained silent during the meeting, telephoned P afterward to inform him of the plan, calling Ds' scheme a 'witch hunt.' Two days later on April 20, 2001, P's counsel telephoned DeJane to advise him of P's legal representation and the potential legal ramifications for the City if it followed through on the plan devised by Ds during the April 18 meeting. On April 22, 2001, P received his 'right to sue' letter from EEOC. Four days after that, Greenamyer (D) suspended P for one twenty-four-hour shift, based on his alleged infraction of a D and/or Fire Department policy. P claimed the suspension was a result of selective enforcement in retaliation for his having obtained legal representation. P appealed to the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the suspension, finding that 'because the regulation [that P was alleged to have violated] was not effective[,] P could not be charged with violation of it.' P filed suit asserting Title VII claims of sex discrimination and retaliation, claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims of invasion of privacy and civil conspiracy. The district court dismissed the federal claims and granted judgment on the pleadings to Ds pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The district judge also dismissed the state law claims without prejudice, having declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). P appealed. 

Issues

Rule of Law

Holding and Decision

Legal Analysis

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